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The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in
Domestic Counterterrorism
Aziz Z. Huq*
A wave of attempted domestic terrorism attacks in 2009 and 2010 has
sharpened attention to the threat of domestic-source terrorism inspired or
directed by al Qaeda. Seeking to preempt that terror,governments face an
information problem. They must separate signals of terrorism riskfrom potentially overwhelming background noise and persuadejuries orfact finders
that those signals warrant coercive action. Selection of accurate signals of
terrorism danger in the information-poor circumstances of domestic
counterterrorismis arguably a central challenge today for law enforcement
tasked with preventing further terrorist attacks. To an underappreciated
extent, governments have used religious speech as a proxy for terrorism risk
in order to resolve this signaling problem. This Article analyzes the legal
and policy significance of state reliance upon religious speech as a predictor
of terrorism risk. Constitutional doctrine under the Religion Clauses does
recognize interests implicated by the signalingfunction of religious speech.
Yet analysis suggests that such doctrinalprotection is fragile. Symptomatic
of a wider inflexibility of pre-9/11 constitutional doctrine, this doctrinal
protection shows little capacityfor responsive change. The absence of constitutional barriers, however, does not mean government should persist in
relying on religious speech as a signal. Rather, analysis of counterterrorism
policy concerns suggests anotherpath. Institutional considerations and an
emerging social science literature on terrorism suggest that religious speech
is ill suited to the signaling role it now plays. Instead, empirical social
science on terrorismpoints to the epistemic superiority of a different signal:
the close associationsof a terrorism suspect. The Article concludes by examining the constitutionality of such a signal and elaborating ways that
insight from the new social science of terrorism can be realized without
compromising important individual interests.

* Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for
participants at faculty workshops at the University of Chicago Law School, Cardozo Law School,
Columbia Law School, the George Washington University Law School, Harvard Law School, the
University of Michigan Law School, and the University of Virginia Law School for helpful
comments and incisive criticism, and to the staff of the Texas Law Review for excellent editorial
work. I am especially grateful to the Carnegie Scholars Fellowship for provided funding during the
research and drafting of this Article, and to the Frank Cicero, Jr. Faculty Fund for support during the
completion of this Article. All errors, of course, are mine alone.
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Introduction

Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, law enforcement
agencies in the United States and Europe have strived to anticipate and to
intervene early against alleged terrorist conspiracies.' Governments focus
investigative or regulatory resources on a point substantially before the occurrence of violence, sometimes before clear evidence demonstrates violence
to be imminent. This preemptive approach, however, creates an informational problem for governments. They must act without the factual
predicates that typically flag criminal violence. Governments, that is, often
1. See, e.g., Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft to Heads of Department Components
(Nov. 8,2001), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2001/November/01_ag580.htm (announcing that the
Justice Department "must shift its primary focus from investigating and prosecuting past crimes to
identifying threats of future terrorist acts, preventing them from happening, and punishing would-be
perpetrators").
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lack reliable signals of the intention to commit or abet violence and must instead identify new signals of dangerousness to serve as proxies for overt
evidence of a terrorist threat. Selection of accurate signals of terrorism danger in the information-poor circumstances of domestic counterterrorism is
arguably the central challenge for law enforcement tasked with prevention of
further terrorist attacks on American soil. The task has taken on new urgency after a wave of domestic-source terrorism incidents in late 2009 and
early 2010.2 Those attempts prompted the White House in the May 2010
National Security Strategy to "underscore[] the threat to the United States
and our interests posed by individuals radicalized at home."
My aim in this Article is to evaluate one proxy that governments use as
Religious speech has to an
a solution to this signaling problem.
underappreciated extent4 become for law enforcement in both the United
States and the United Kingdom a signal to identify high-risk terrorist threats.
Consider the following examples:5
* Federal law enforcement officers arrest a Pakistani immigrant
recently returned from what might have been training in a foreign
terrorist camp. Unable to prove that the suspect in fact received
training, the Government charges him with a "material support"
offense 6 in relation to a planned future attack. To show the suspect's
intent to commit this future attack, the Government relies on an
Arabic note found in his wallet at the time of arrest that reads, "Oh
Allah, we place you at their throats, and we seek refuge in you from
their evil." The jury convicts.7
* Immigration officials refuse entry to a religious scholar-whose
sermons and scholarship, they believe, implicitly condone
2. These include the decision of a Somali-American to travel back to Somalia and become the
first American suicide bomber; the July 2009 arrest of seven Muslims in North Carolina; the
September 2009 arrest of Afghan-born Najibullah Zazi based on allegations that he intended to
complete an attack on the New York subway system; the November 5, 2009 shooting spree by
Army psychiatrist Major Nidal Hasan at Fort Hood, TX, which left thirteen dead; the December
2009 arrest of Pakistani-American David Headley and others in connection with the 2008 Mumbai
attacks; the Christmas Day 2009 attempt by Nigerian Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to detonate
explosives on board Detroit-bound Northwest Air, flight 253; the May 1,2010 attempt by Pakistaniborn American citizen Faisal Shahzad to explode a car bomb in New York's Times Square; and the
June 5, 2010 arrest of two New Jersey men allegedly on their way to fight in Somalia. See
generally Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1715,

1716 & n.8 (2010) (recognizing the "ascendancy of homegrown terrorism" and discussing the
examples listed above as well as others).
3. WHITE

HOUSE,

NATIONAL

SECURITY

STRATEGY

19

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/national-security

(2010),

available

at

strategy.pdf.

4. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM.

L. REV. 1413, 1419 n.22 (2002) (explicitly declining, in an important article about post-9/1 1
profiling, to address religious profiling); infra subpart II(B).
5. See infra Part II.
6. For the various "material support" criminal offenses, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A-2339C (2006).
7. Amy Waldman, PropheticJustice, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2006, at 82.
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antidemocratic violence-for fear that he will win converts while a
visiting professor at a major university. The scholar is unable to enter the country.
* Days after the September II attacks, an imam in a Virginia mosque
gives a sermon to a select core group of male congregants, praising
resistance to injustice against Muslims. Two of his listeners decide
to go to Afghanistan to fight the U.S. forces deployed there. Based
on their decision and the contents of his sermon, the imam is charged
and convicted on federal conspiracy and incitement charges. 9
In each of these cases, law enforcement has not had unequivocal
evidence of an intention to commit acts of violence. Instead, it has leaned on
religious speech or doctrine as a proxy for a suspect's intention to violate the
law in the future or to encourage others to violate the law. In this fashion,
religious speech plays a signaling function in the course of domestic
counterterrorism focused on minority Muslim communities. 0 Attention to
the religious speech of these communities is a consequence of al Qaeda's
explicitly religious justifications for the September 11 attacks and its
subsequent appeals for support grounded in religious solidarity." This
attention means immigration officials, prosecutors, and juries are scrutinizing
doctrinal intricacies, previously the domain of the devout and scholastic, to
discern who among a minority religious or ethnic community poses a terrorist threat.
But is such reliance constitutional? The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment seem, at least on their face, to restrain the government's reliance
on such proxies.12 And even if constitutional, is reliance on religious speech
as a signal in the domestic counterterrorism context wise? Under what circumstances does religious speech function as an effective signal of and proxy
for the intention to commit terrorist violence? How best is the signaling
problem in domestic counterterrorism resolved?
This Article evaluates government reliance on religious speech as a
signal in counterterrorism through the lenses of constitutional law and

8. Pamela Constable, Divisive ScholarDraws ParallelsBetween Islam and Democracy, WASH.

POST, Apr. 11, 2007, at B6.
9. Jerry Markon, Va. Muslim Spiritual Leader Gets Life, WASH. POST, July 13, 2005,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/13/AR2005071301596.html.
10. Predictably, the costs of post-9/11 counterterrorism law enforcement have landed
disproportionately on Muslim-American communities. Aziz Huq, The New Counterterrorism:
Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in LIBERTY UNDER ATTACK: RECLAIMING OUR
FREEDOMS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 167, 182 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007).
11. See generally MARY HABECK, KNOWING THE ENEMY: JIHADIST IDEOLOGY AND THE WAR
ON TERROR 7-14 (2006) (summarizing al Qaeda's putative theological justifications for the
September 11 attacks); MESSAGES TO THE WORLD: THE STATEMENTS OF OSAMA BIN LADEN 10405, 109 (Bruce Lawrence ed., 2005).
12. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . .").
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counterterrorism policy. Consider first the constitutional question. The
government's use of religious speech as a signal of terrorism risk indirectly
casts a shadow on the exercise of religious liberties. When the government
declares in the context of a criminal investigation or trial that a religious
phrase or doctrine will be treated as evidence of terrorist intent, it creates a
nontrivial incentive on the part of a suspect's co-religionists not to use that
phrase or doctrine. Use of religious speech as a signal thus interposes the
government, albeit obliquely, into the ongoing confessional life of a religious
community in a way that can change the terms of doctrinal and spiritual
practice. The Supreme Court has recognized a religious community's interest in epistemic autonomy-a communal freedom to hold and to revise
religious views. But doctrinal protection of this epistemic autonomy is
fragile. It supplies inadequate resources to resist post-9/1 1 pressures. This is
symptomatic of a wider trend: the failure of pre-9/11 constitutional doctrine
to respond to new ways in which constitutional rights are compromised as
government confronts a new kind of terrorism threat.
But that does not mean the government should persist in relying on
religious speech as a signal. Rather, institutional considerations and an
emerging social science literature concerning the etiology of terrorism suggest that religious speech is ill suited to the signaling role it now plays. In
institutional terms, government is ill equipped to make judgments about the
meaning of religious speech. The error rate in state interpretations of religious speech will hence be high. More importantly, recent empirical social
science research concerning the origins and predicates of terrorism suggests
that variance in religious speech does not correlate with the risk of terrorist
violence. This empirical and social science work suggests the superiority of
a different signal: the close associations of a suspect. Terrorism's emergence
is regularly associated with the presence of insular groups that break off from
the cultural or subcultural mainstream to form their own discrete ethical and
normative subcultures. Identification of these insular groups, and not some
search for particular kinds of religiosity, provides some guidance as to the
likely incidence of terrorist violence.
I compare religious speech and close associations by applying tools
developed in the economics literature to solve signaling problems. Economic
analysis of signaling problems shows that a signal is effective when "the cost
of the signal is negatively correlated with the unseen characteristic that is
[sought]."" (Consider, for example, the function of education in the job
market: Provided the cost of education is inversely related to productivity,
education levels can signal a potential employee's productivity to employers

13. Michael Spence, Signaling in Retrospect and the Informational Structure of Markets, 92
AM. ECON. REv. 434, 437 (2002); see also PATRICK BOLTON & MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT,
CONTRACT THEORY 100-07 (2005).
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even if education itself does not increase marginal productivity.)' 4 Applying
this framework to the terrorism context suggests that law enforcement should
not rely on religious speech as a signal and instead should develop strategies
to disaggregate the insular and close-knit groups in which terrorism emerges
from a wider religious or ethnic cohort.' 5
This Article has two supplemental goals. First, it aims to prompt more
empirically informed dialogue about the evolution of counterterrorism practice and legal doctrine. It seems likely that the first wave of counterterrorism
policies adopted after 9/11, many under tight time and informational
constraints, included suboptimal practices as a result of policy makers'
bounded rationality and imperfect information. Possible welfare gains are to
be found in updating and improving those policies. 16 Yet despite the switch
of administrations in the White House, the course of federal counterterrorism
policy has been characterized by more continuity than change.17 Second, the
September 11 attacks catalyzed new investments in social science and
empirical work on the causes and consequences of terrorism.1 Yet this
empirical literature is rarely invoked in the legal academy's debates on
security policy. This is a needless loss.
Part II of the Article introduces the problem by describing criminal and
immigration proceedings in which government has acted preemptively by
relying on religious speech. Part III turns to the religious liberty issues under
the First Amendment. It contends that the constitutional interests at stake are
largely "underenforced." 9 Part IV examines the policy dimensions of reliance on religious speech as a signal, drawing on recent empirical work to
query how religious speech correlates with the incidence of terrorism and
then proposes association as an alternative.
14. Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87

Q.J. ECON.

355, 361-68 (1973).

15. A similar analysis has been applied to the problem of airport screening to suggest that
reliance on visible attributes is suboptimal. Atin Basuchoudhary & Laura Razzolini, Hiding in
Plain Sight-Using Signals to Detect Terrorists, 128 PUB. CHOICE 245, 254 (2006). The present

analysis extends that basic framework to a different context.
16. But see ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 33-34 (2007) (opining that the political process generally prevents
liberal democratic governments from adopting policies that unnecessarily restrict liberty).
17. See Peter Baker, Obama's War Over Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010 (Magazine), at 33
(observing that during his first year in office President Obama "has adopted the bulk of the
counterterrorism strategy he found on his desk when he arrived in the Oval Office, a strategy
already moderated from the earliest days after Sept. 11, 2001").
18. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. ON SOC., BEHAVIORAL & ECON. SCIS., NAT'L SC. & TECH. COUNCIL,
COMBATING TERRORISM: RESEARCH PRIORITIES IN THE SOCIAL, BEHAVIORAL AND ECONOMIC
SCIENCES 6 (2006) (chronicling the formation of the Task Force on Anti-Terrorism Research and
Development in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks).
19. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced

Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978) (explaining that "underenforced"
constitutional norms occur in "those situations in which the [Supreme Court], because of
institutional concerns, has failed to enforce a provision of the Constitution to its full conceptual
boundaries").
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Religious Speech and Doctrine as a Signal in Counterterrorism

Religious speech and doctrine play an increasingly significant, if
underappreciated, role in domestic counterterrorism enforcement in the
United States and elsewhere thanks to a post-9/11 shift to preemptive policing strategies. This Part explores the causes of that trend and sets forth
examples of religious speech's use as a signal in criminal law, immigration,
and other enforcement actions in the United States and the United Kingdom.
A. Preemptive Domestic CounterterrorismStrategies
Terrorist attacks have potentially catastrophic consequences. Unlike the
policing of burglary, murder, or fraud, a counterterrorism policing strategy
wholly reliant on interdicting past offenders likely will be suboptimal. And
for most governments, "prosecution of completed terrorist acts [alone] is not
deemed sufficient." 20 As a result, numerous governments have adopted a
preemptive approach to terrorist interdiction since 9/11 that is aimed at the
early stages of terrorist conspiracies. At the same time, they have invested
more resources in domestic counterterrorism policing. 21 Because terrorism
often lacks many of the overt antecedent acts associated with quotidian
crime, and because a suspect's preparatory conduct may be evidence of terrorism only in hindsight, 22 law enforcement must identify and deploy new
signals of terrorist intent to sort threats from the general population.
Governments overtly adopted a preemptive approach soon after 9/11.
In November 2001, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that the
U.S. Department of Justice "must shift its primary focus from investigating
and prosecuting past crimes to identifying threats of future terrorist acts,
preventing them from happening, and punishing would-be perpetrators."23

20. Wayne McCormack, Inchoate Terrorism: Liberalism Clashes with Fundamentalism, 37
GEO. J. INT'L L. 1, 18 (2005).
21. See, e.g., TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, CRIMINAL TERRORISM
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DURING THE FIVE YEARS SINCE THE 9/11/01 ATTACKS

(2006), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorismi/169/ ("In the twelve months immediately after 9/11,
the prosecution of individuals the government classified as international terrorists surged sharply
higher than in the previous year."); Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Fact Sheet: Department of
Justice Anti-Terrorism Efforts Since Sept. 11, 2001 (Sept. 5, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/opal
pr/2006/September/06_opa_590.htmI (outlining the various measures taken by the Department of
Justice to combat domestic terrorism since 9/11, including prosecuting and convicting more
terrorists, increasing border security funding, and restructuring the FBI to eliminate more terrorist
threats). More recent data suggests that criminal justice resources have been deployed in a more

"efficient" manner. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD,
at i (20 10).
22. Consider the purchase of box cutters by the 9/11 hijackers. Serge Schmemman, US
Attacked: President Vows to Exact Punishmentfor 'Evil,' N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.

23. Memorandum from Att'y Gen. John Ashcroft, supra note 1; see also Paul J. McNulty,
Deputy Att'y Gen., Prepared Remarks at the American Enterprise Institute (May 24, 2006),
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/speeches/2006/dagspeech_060524.html ("And, in
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The Justice Department now leans on inchoate or "precursor" offenses such
as the material support statutes that allow for prosecution long before an act
of terrorism is imminent.2 4 The federal government also supplements criminal prosecution with regulatory complements. Immigration regulation, with
its relaxed procedural constraints and more expansive substantive reach, also
supplies the government with tools to act in the absence of clear evidence of
imminent violence.25
The trend toward preemptive strategies has been accelerated by growing
concem about terrorism that originates at home rather than abroad. The
September 11 attacks originated overseas.26 But other recent terrorist attacks,
first in Europe and then in the United States, have had domestic origins. 27 As
a result, governments on both sides of the Atlantic have placed special
emphasis on the need to identify and eliminate domestic "sleeper cells."28
Since the early 1990s, the British government has monitored al Qaeda efforts
to recruit within the United Kingdom and to establish a domestic network.29
British counterterrorism strategy singles out local Muslim communities as
places where radicalization and recruitment to terrorism occur. 30 And even
before the July 2005 attacks on London buses and trains, British media

deciding whether to prosecute, we will not wait to see what can become of risks. The death and
destruction of September 11, 2001, mandate a transformed and preventative approach.").
24. For surveys of the use of material support and related criminal offenses as preemptive tools,
see Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military
Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1079, 1101-03 (2008), and Robert M. Chesney, Beyond
Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L.

REv. 425, 446-92 (2007). Applications of one section of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B (2006), were upheld against constitutional challenge in Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project,130 S. Ct. 2705, 2731 (2010).
25. See generally Donald Kerwin & Margaret D. Stock, The Role of Immigration in a
CoordinatedNational Security Policy, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 383, 398-423 (2007) (surveying the

function of immigration law in counterterrorism strategy).
26. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 155 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
27. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE BOMBINGS IN LONDON ON 7TH JULY
2005, at 13 (2006) [hereinafter REPORT ON LONDON BOMBINGS], available at http://www.official-

documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hcl0/1087/1087.pdf (asserting that the perpetrators of the
bombings in London grew up on the outskirts of Leeds in West Yorkshire).
28. See Intelligence Reform: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong.
89 (2007) [hereinafter Intelligence Reform Hearing] (statement of Charles E. Allen, Assistant
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland
Security) (describing new focus on "domestic terrorists" including "Islamic extremists (Sunni and
Shia)"). In 2002, federal authorities identified a suspected sleeper cell in Lakawanna, New York,
leading to high-profile arrests and convictions. DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR, at
xiii, 198-205 (2007).
29. See U.K. HOME DEP'T, THE UNITED KINGDOM'S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 28 (2009) [hereinafter U.K. STRATEGY] ("By the early nineties some

propagandists for Egyptian and other organisations had settled in London. ... Al Qa'ida recruited
people from the UK and established a network here.").
30. Id. at 15.

2011]

The Signaling Function of Religious Speech

841

sounded regular alarms about the possibility that residents of the United
Kingdom might commit acts of terrorism.3 1
In the United States, federal officials also took seriously the risk of
"homegrown" terrorism after 9/11, albeit later than in the United Kingdom.
In January 2007, for example, a Homeland Security official told a House of
Representatives committee that domestic "radicalization challenges" had
prompted the creation of a new unit in the Department of Homeland Security
"focused exclusively on radicalization in the Homeland." 32 In May 2009, the
Senate Homeland Security Committee held a hearing on "Violent Islamist
Extremism: al-Shabaab Recruitment in America," exploring terrorist recruitment among Minneapolis's Somali-American population. According to
FBI testimony, government surveillance and analysis had found Minneapolis
to be a site of "an active and deliberate attempt to recruit individuals . . . to

travel to Somalia to fight or train on behalf of [the Somali Islamist
movement]." 33 This prompted law enforcement "concern[]" that a U.S.
national recruited in Minnesota might return from fighting overseas "to
conduct attacks inside the United States." 3 4 The concern escalated after a
series of domestic-source terrorism incidents in late 2009 and early 2010.35
In May 2010, Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism John Brennan warned that "an increasing number of
31. See, e.g., Don't Point, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 2005, at 51 (discussing the intensified fears

regarding a terrorist attack in Britain); Daniel McGrory, The New Enemy Within, TIMES (U.K.),
Dec. 6, 2003, at 19 (discussing the typical British-born sleepers that are recruited into Islamic terror
groups); Martin Bright & Jason Burke, Is There an Enemy Within?, OBSERVER (U.K.), Feb. 27,
2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/feb/27/terrorism.september11 (reporting fears among
government and security officials that "the threat from British Muslim extremists is now at least as
great as that from foreign terrorists"); Philip Johnston, Home-Grown Fundamentalists Pose a
Threat to Britain, Too, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), May 2, 2003, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/
personal-view/3590781/Home-grown-fundamentalists-pose-a-threat-to-Britain-too.html (discussing
the involvement of two British Muslims in a suicide bomb attack in Israel); Raymond Whitaker et
al., Special Report: Terror in Britain: The Terror Timebomb, INDEP. (U.K.), Apr. 4, 2004, available

at 2004 WLNR 10582926 (chronicling the efforts of Islamist extremists to recruit disaffected young
British Muslims).
32. Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Intelligence Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (written
testimony of Charles E. Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence
Officer, Department of Homeland Security) (on file with author).
33. Violent Islamist Extremism-2009: HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and

Governmental Affairs, 11lth Cong. 101 (2009) (statement of Philip Mudd, Associate Executive
Assistant Director, FBI).

34. Id
35. See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Major Held in Fort Hood Rampage Is Chargedwith 13
Counts of Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at A14 (reporting the charging of Major Nidal Malik
Hasan, who espoused "beliefs that America's wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were wars against all
Muslims," with thirteen counts of murder after he opened fire at Fort Hood); William K. Rashbaum,
2 Men Seized at JFK., Accused ofPlotting Jihad,N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, at Al (reporting the

arrest of two men who were seeking to "join[] an Islamic extremist group to kill American troops");
Andrea Elliott et al., For Times Sq. Suspect, Long Roots of Discontent, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/16/nyregion/16suspect.html (reporting on Faisal Shahzad, the
man accused of planting a car bomb in Times Square).
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individuals here in the United States [have] become captivated by extremist
activities or causes."36 This caution took official form in the 2010 National
Security Strategy, which stated that "recent incidences of violent extremists
in the United States" demonstrate "the threat to the United States and our
interests posed by individuals radicalized at home."3 7
It is the rising concerns about domestic terrorism and the demand for
prophylaxis and prevention of terrorism attacks that in tandem push law enforcement toward novel investigation and prosecution strategies. Prosecutors
must establish culpability for serious criminal offenses even though they
have fewer overt acts with which to work. In doing so, they face a serious
information deficit. Downstream, prosecutors also have fewer reliable indicators of guilt upon which to build a case. Sorting for individuals who
present a danger will be consistently more difficult at both the investigative
and prosecution stages. And it is to remedy this informational deficit that
law enforcement and prosecutors turn to religious speech as a signal of terrorist risk.
B. CriminalProsecutions andReligious Speech
In April 2006, a jury convicted Hamid Hayat, a Californian of Pakistani
descent, of material support for terrorism.3 Federal prosecutors had charged
Hayat with one count of providing material support for a transnational
terrorist act and three counts of making willful, false statements related to a
journey in 2003 or 2004 to Pakistan, allegedly to "receive jihadist training."39
Yet Hayat had committed no act of violence. And scant evidence demonstrated his intent to commit a future act of violence, which was an element of
the material support offense.40 While he had confessed to having visited a
training camp in Pakistan, it was unclear whether he had stayed long enough
to receive training.4 1 His confession was "vague and even contradictory."42
On the material support charge, the prosecution's remaining evidence was
36. Obama's New Security Strategy Stresses Diplomacy, BBC NEWS,

May 27, 2010,

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10169144.
37. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 3, at 19.
38. Rone Tempest, In Lodi Terror Case, Intent Was the Clincher, L.A. TIMES, May 1, 2006, at

B 1; see also Government's Trial Memorandum at 2-5, United States v. Hayat, No. S-05-240 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Hayat Trial Memo] (listing the counts).
39. Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 2-5. Hayat's father Umer Hayat was also charged
with two counts of making false, material statements. Id. at 5. The charges against him were later
dropped. Neil MacFarquhar, Echoes of Terror Case Haunt Cahfornia Pakistanis, N.Y. TIMES,

Apr. 27, 2007, at Al.
40. See Tempest, supra note 38 (noting that the prosecution "had no direct evidence").
41. See John

Diaz,

The Phantom Terrorist Camp, SFGATE.COM,

Sept.

16, 2007,

http://articles.sfgate.com/2007-09-16/opinion/17260704_1_terrorist-camp-fbi-headquarters-hamidhayat (noting that "the prosecution offered no direct evidence to corroborate Hayat's admission of
attending a terrorist training camp" and that Hayat's admissions of having attended the camp "were
rife with bizarre details and contradictions").
42. Tempest, supra note 38.
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equivocal.43 Unsurprisingly, Hayat's intention to commit future terrorism
emerged as key for a successful prosecution.4 4
To prove Hayat's mens rea, the prosecution relied on an Arabiclanguage prayer found in Hayat's wallet at the time of his arrest.45 The
prosecution labeled this "the throat note.' " Initially, the prosecution translated the Arabic text as, "Lord, let us be at their throats, and we ask you to
give us refuge from their evil."A7 When the defense objected to this
translation, negotiations resulted in the note being admitted into evidence
translated as "Oh Allah, we place you at their throats, and we seek refuge in
you from their evil."48
To demonstrate that the throat note was evidence of Hayat's mens rea,
the U.S. Attorney proffered expert testimony from Professor Khaleel
Mohammed, a professor of religious studies at San Diego State University.49
Mohammed conceded that he did not know Hayat.50 He also conceded that
he did not know how Hayat understood the throat note because Hayat
himself had exercised his Fifth Amendment right not to testify." But,
Mohammed insisted, the throat note could be read in only one way. It was a
prayer "used by Muslim fanatics and extremists that consider themselves to
,,52
be in a state of war with the rest of the world or their own government.
Mohammed, that is, offered a categorical reading of the note applicable to
Summarizing its case, the
anyone sharing a particular religious identity.

43. Principally, the State relied on an "irresolute" confession with "scant and fuzzy" details of
the terrorist acts Hayat was to aid. Waldman, supranote 7, at 82-83; accordDiaz,supra note 41.
44. See Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 16 (describing the necessary mens rea as whether
"the defendant knew or intended that the material support and resources were to be used in
preparation for or in carrying out a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332b, which prohibits acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries").
45. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 83 ("[T]he prosecution cited [the note] as 'probative
evidence' that Hayat had 'the requisite jihadist intent' .....
46. Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 34.
47. Id
48. Id; see also Denny Walsh, Witness Is Pressedon Hoyat Prayer,SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar.

16, 2006, http://www.sacbee.com/2006/03/16/6552/witness-is-pressed-on-hayat-prayer.html.
49. Waldman, supra note 7, at 89.
50. Walsh, supra note 48.
51. Stephen Magagnini, Closing Phase Begins Today in Lodi Terror Case, SACRAMENTO BEE,

Apr. 12, 2006, http://www.sacbee.com/2006/04/12/6580/closing-phase-begins-today-in.html; see
also Mark Araz, The Agent Who Might Have Saved Hamid Hayat, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at 1
(noting that Hayat did not testify).
52. Walsh, supra note 48. Mohammed also testified that "the supplication would be carried by
a holy warrior ready to fight the enemies of Islam. He suggested that the throat is 'the most
vulnerable spot' for a 'mortal wound,' and added, 'You are asking God to be your champion."'
Demian Bulwa, Trial Focuses on Notation: Warrior's Creed or Simple Prayer, SFGATE.COM,

Mar. 15, 2006, http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-03-15/bay-area/17284650_I1lodi-man-fbi-agentsumer-hayat.
53. Offered for the purposes of one case, Mohammed's interpretation by definition claims a
wider applicability. Defense lawyers found several religious experts who disagreed with
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prosecution invoked the throat note to show that Hayat had "a jihadi heart
and a jihadi mind"5 4 and also as evidence that "Hayat attended a jihadist
training camp" with "the requisite jihadist intent." 5 The throat note and
other religious speech in Hayat's possession swung the jury toward
conviction. 56 Indeed, the jury foreman subsequently explained that the throat
note and related expert testimony had been "quite critical."
Hayat's case is not unique. Criminal prosecutions of a New York-based
group of thirteen alleged militants led by an Egyptian sheikh, Omar AbdulRahman, in the early 1990s also relied on the sheikh's sermons as evidence
The 2004 material support
of his involvement in a terrorist conspiracy.
prosecution of Idaho webmaster Sami al-Hussayen hinged on evidence of
religious dogma on the websites the defendant had maintained, which was
used in an effort to show his mens rea.9 One journalist observing the trial
later evaluated the Government's case by saying that "it seemed as if the
government wanted to put the religion of Islam in the dock." 60 After a jury
reached a hung verdict in the 2007 trial of Narseal Baptiste and six others
based on their alleged conspiracy to attack the Sears Tower, the Government
signaled its renewed commitment to the case by reaching for evidence of the
defendants' religious views to demonstrate their violent intent for a retrial. 6 1
Similarly, in the 2008 retrial of the Holy Land Foundation on terroristfinancing charges, prosecutors thought to introduce expert evidence "that
repeated use of traditional Muslim greetings can be a sign of unity with
terrorists" to establish the defendant's intent.6 2

Mohammed's interpretation, but all proved "reluctant" to testify. Waldman, supra note 7, at 89-90.
These experts may have been unwilling to irk a potential future employer-the federal government.
54. Id. at 82.
55. Hayat Trial Memo, supra note 38, at 35.
56. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 92 (explaining that the jury "conclud[ed] that the evidence
suggesting that Hayat would act-the scrapbook, the prayer, and so on-was stronger than the
evidence that he would not").
57. Id at 90.
58. Robert L. Jackson, CaseAgainst Muslim Cleric Could Blow Up in Prosecutors'Faces,L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 28, 1994, at A5; James C. McKinley Jr., Sheik's Talk at Issue in Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1995, at B2.
59. See PAUL M. BARRETT, AMERICAN ISLAM: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF A RELIGION
248-49 (2007) (describing the material that al-Hussayen allegedly disseminated over the Internet);
Timothy Egan, Computer Student on Trial over Muslim Web Site Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004,
at A16; Maureen O'Hagan, A Terrorism Case that Went Awry, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002097570_sami22m.html.
60. BARRETT, supra note 59, at 244.
61. See, e.g., Curt Anderson, Defense Fears TerrorismRetrial Won't Be Fairto 6 Defendants,
DAILY J., Jan. 3, 2008, available at http://www.daily-journal.com/archives/dj/display.phpid=
411128 (noting prosecutors' intention to introduce evidence to portray the ringleader of the plot as a
"Muslim fanatic").
62. Jason Trahan, Lawyers Tangle About Greetings, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Sept. 25, 2008, at
IB. The prosecution did not go forward with this strategy.
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In each of these cases, prosecutors sought to use the criminal law
preemptively. In each case, lacking the necessary evidence of overt acts,
U.S. Attorneys turned to religious speech as a proxy for criminal intent.
These prosecutions relied on the assumption that religious speech could
supply an accurate signal of an intention to commit acts of terrorism. But
these criminal trials, which in any event comprise only a fraction of a criminal justice system dominated by plea bargaining, likely represent only a
portion of the total number of cases in which the government relies on religious speech. The incidence of religious speech at the prosecution stage as a
signal of criminal intent is suggestive of a greater reliance on the same kind
of evidence upstream-in investigations. Even setting aside those investigations that do not end in charges, many terrorism investigations (perhaps a
majority) end in "pretextual" charges, from wire fraud to immigration
crimes.63 Such charges are unconnected with terrorism but form the possible
basis for a less costly type of punitive action." In those cases, the state's
upstream reliance on religious speech for singling out a suspect is never
revealed. At the very least, therefore, any estimation of the use of religious
speech as a signal in counterterrorism that relies on reported trials is likely to
yield an undercount, and probably a substantial one.
Religious speech can play a second function in criminal prosecutions. It
can also be the actus reus for a terrorism offense. One example is a case that
arose in Virginia soon after 9/11. On the evening of September 11, 2001, an
imam named Ali al-Timimi and his circle of followers met at the storefront
Dar al Arqam Center in Falls Church, Virginia:
At the meeting, Al-Timimi stated that the September 11 attacks were
justified and that the end of time battle had begun. He said that
America was at war with Islam, and that the attendees should leave the
United States. The preferred option was to heed the call of Mullah
Omar, leader of the Taliban, to participate in the defense of Muslims
in Afghanistan and fight against United States troops that were
expected to invade in pursuit of Al-Qaeda. 5
Based on that speech al-Timimi was prosecuted on several inchoate
offense and solicitation counts. 6 6 In addition to the September 11 speech, the
prosecution invoked a February 2003 sermon in which al-Timimi spoke of
the crash of the U.S. space shuttle Columbia as an omen of the imminent end

63. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 622 (2005) (explaining the

charging of suspected terrorists with lesser offenses including immigration violations, identity theft,
visa fraud, and money laundering).
64. Cf Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecutions, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1175-76 (2004) (defending
the practice of pretextual charges); Richman & Stuntz, supra note 63, at 584-87 (explaining
pretextual charges).
65. United States v. Khan, 309 F. Supp. 2d 789, 810 (E.D. Va. 2004).
66. McCormack, supra note 20, at 1 & n. 1.
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of the West's domination of the Muslim world.67 In an opening statement,
the prosecutor focused on the content of the sermons, asserting that "[the]
case [was] about what Al-Timimi told the young men who respected him,
who revered him ... who loved him, and most of all, who listened to him."6 8
Al-Timimi was convicted on ten counts of inducing or soliciting others to
commit various crimes related to his disciples' overseas travel to aid the
Taliban.69 Evidence of his actus reus largely comprised his sermons.70
These statements, the jury concluded, had a predictable effect on his
codefendants, such that al-Timimi could be held criminally liable.7
Al-Timimi's case shows how religious speech or dogma can be a basis
for solicitation or aiding-and-abetting charges. Moreover, it suggests that
such prosecutions can rely on ambiguous religious statements that require
interpretation. It is plausible to posit slightly different factual circumstances
in which a prosecutor would want to move forward but would have to rely on
speech with less substantial overt links to terrorism.
The same trend is visible in other countries. The United Kingdom has
enacted laws aimed at "changing the environment in which the extremists
and those radicalising others can operate" 72 by criminalizing speech that
often will be framed with religious terminology. Section 1 of the Terrorism
Act 2006 criminalizes publications where the publisher "intends members of
the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the
statement to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism." 73 This
"encouragement of terrorism" prohibition reaches "statements that are likely
to be understood by members of the public as indirectly encouraging the
commission or preparation of acts of terrorism" and also "every statement
which ... glorifies the commission or preparation (whether in the past, in the
future, or generally) of such acts or offences."74 The offense "implement[s]
the requirements of Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on the
Prevention of Terrorism," which requires state parties to criminalize "'public
provocation to commit a terrorist offense.'" 75 Another provision in the 2006
Terrorism Act criminalizes "[d]issemination of terrorist publications,"
including circulating, selling, lending, or offering for sale or loan, any

67. Milton Viorst, The Education ofAli al-Timimi, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 2006, at 69, 78.
68. Id.
69. McCormack, supra note 20, at 1 & n.1; Jerry Markon, Muslim Leader Is Found Guilty,
WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2005, at Al.
70. See McCormack, supra note 20, at 2 (explaining that the acts resulting in al-Timimi's
convictions primarily involved only speaking with and advising others).
71. See Markon, supra note 69 (describing prosecutorial arguments that al-Timimi's words
were intended to cause violence and the subsequent guilty verdict imposed by the jury).
72. U.K. STRATEGY, supra note 29, at 12.
73. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 1(2)(b)(i).
74. Id. § 1(3) (emphasis added).
75. TERRORISM ACT 2006: EXPLANATORY NOTES T 20, at 4 (2006).
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publication intended to be "direct or indirect encouragement or other
inducement to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of
terrorism."76
Prosecutions under these provisions have been few, far between, and
In one high-profile case, an imam named Abu
poorly documented
Izzadeen was arrested for glorifying terrorism. 7 8 While that charge was
dropped, he was convicted of inciting terrorism overseas and fundraising for
terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000.79 In another case, a woman defendant who called herself the "lyrical terrorist" was convicted under a different
statutory terrorism offense of possession of "a record of information of a
kind likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of
terrorism."80 While the information at issue included materials with practical
implications for planning a terrorist act,81 her trial was characterized by
discussion of quasi-religious poems that she had written seemingly in praise
of terrorist actions. It is not implausible to think the quasi-religious poetry
introduced at trial played a role in her conviction by demonstrating her mens
rea.82
C. Regulatory Actions Based on Religious Speech
Criminal prosecution is not the only way to disrupt or disperse a
terrorist conspiracy. Governments also use noncriminal regulatory regimes
such as immigration law, financial regulation, and legal proscriptions of certain groups. Like their criminal counterparts, these regulatory actions can
turn on religious speech.

76. Terrorism Act 2006, §§ 2(i)(a), 2(2).
77. According to a U.K. government audit of counterterrorism actions, there have been such
actions. See LORD CARLILE OF BERRIEW Q.C., REPORT ON THE OPERATION IN 2007 OF THE
TERRORISM ACT 2000 AND OF PART I OF THE TERRORISM ACT 2006, at 56 (2008) ("There have
been successful prosecutions brought under the section [criminalizing the glorification of terrorism],
and others are pending."); CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., VIOLENT ExTREMISM AND RELATED
CRIMINAL OFFENCES §5, http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent-extremism.html
(describing some successful antiterrorism prosecutions but none under the antiglorification laws).
78. But there have been some arrests. See, e.g., Sean O'Neill & Stewart Tendler, Islamist
Radical who Heckled Reid Is Arrested over 'Glorifying of Terrorism,' TIMES (U.K.), Feb. 9, 2007,
at 2; Stephen Wright et al., Hate Preacherwho PraisedBombers Is Among Six Arrested, DAILY
MAIL (U.K.), Apr. 25, 2007, at 20.
79. Sean O'Neill, Muslim Faces Prison over Terror Speeches, TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 18, 2008, at
21.
80. See R v. Malik, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1450 (Eng.); see also S. Chehani Ekaratne,
Redundant Restriction: The U.K.'s Offense of Glorifying Terrorism, 23 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 205,
216-17 (2010) (describing the Malik case).
81. See Haroon Siddique, 'Lyrical Terrorist' Convicted over Hate Records, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
(describing the
Nov. 8, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/nov/08/terrorism.world
documents found in Malik's possession).
82. The conviction was later overturned. Lee Glendinning, 'Lyrical Terrorist' Has Conviction
Quashed, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 17, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/jun/17/uksecurity.
ukcrime.
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American immigration law has long allowed exclusion and deportation
As a result, immigration law is an attractive
on ideological grounds.
prophylactic tool for government when a terrorism prosecution would
otherwise be unavailable. Further, when prosecutors are unable to secure a
conviction, the government can use immigration powers to achieve the
prosecution's interdiction goal at a lower cost. 84 Increasing overlap between
the substantive grounds for deportation and the content of the criminal law
during the past three decades, moreover, has enlarged the substitutability of
deportation for criminal sanctions.s
Amendments to federal immigration law since 1999 expanded
terrorism-related removal grounds and facilitated enforcement actions based
on religious expression. Section 411 of the October 2001 USA PATRIOT
Act authorized the government to deny admission to any alien who had used
a "position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist
activity" or to "persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist
organization."87 A 2005 amendment enlarged the scope of this provision to
include circumstances in which the Attorney General has a reasonable basis
to believe an individual is engaged in, or likely to engage in, terrorist activity
or that the individual endorses or espouses terrorist activity.88 This amendment empowers immigration officials to make predictive judgments about
individuals based on inferences drawn from the individuals' religious beliefs
or statements. Under an earlier iteration of the provision, the Department of
Homeland Security revoked in 2004 a visa granted to Swiss theologian Tariq
Ramadan, telling journalists that Ramadan had "'used a position of

83. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, allowed,
inter alia, the exclusion of any alien "affiliated with groups that advocate World Communism or
Cf DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
totalitarian dictatorship."
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS INTHE WAR ON TERRORISM 164-67 (2003) (describing litigation in

which the Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarran-Walter Act, was struck
down).
84. In at least one case, a failed prosecution has been followed seriatim by an immigration
action. See, e.g., Elaine Silvestrini, ICE Puts Chill on Megahed Acquittal, TAMPA BAY ONLINE,

Apr. 12, 2009, http://www2.tbo.com/content/2009/apr/12/na-ice-puts-chill-on-megahed-acquittall
(noting the use of immigration law to deport Sami al-Hussayen after the failed prosecution of him).
85. See Juliet Stumpf, The CrimmigrationCrisis:Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56

AM. U. L. REV. 367, 381 (2006) (describing an "increasing overlap between criminal and
immigration law").
86. For an overview of relevant changes in the immigration statute, see Gerald L. Neuman,
DiscretionaryDeportation,20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 647-48 (2006). At the same time, judicial
scrutiny of immigration law's workings has diminished. In 1999, the Supreme Court held that "an
alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a
defense against his deportation." Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471,
488 (1999).
87. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §411, 115 Stat. 272, 346.
88. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 103, 119 Stat. 302, 306-07 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 182(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006)).
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prominence ... to endorse or espouse terrorist activity."' 89 Ramadan's
critics outside government also cited his doctrinal writings to justify the exclusion decision. 90
In the United Kingdom, immigration authorities scrutinize foreign
imams' religious views before admitting them into the country. 9' In
November 2003, British immigration authorities detained a senior Deobandi
cleric, Yusuf Motala, and questioned him extensively about "the curricula of
his seminaries, his views on aspects of Islam and alleged connections with
jihadist groups." 9 2 Under rules promulgated in the aftermath of the July 2005
London bus and subway bombings, British authorities have the power to
deport those who "foment, justify or glorify" terrorism. 93 After the attacks,
deportation proceedings were initiated against a Jamaican imam, Abdullah
el-Faisal, who influenced one of the July 2005 suicide bombers by arguing
after September 2001 that "the Koran justified attacks on non-Muslims." 94 In
August 2005, then-Home Secretary Charles Clarke also banned Syrian-born
cleric Omar Bakri Mohammed from returning to the United Kingdom on the
ground that "his presence is not conducive to the public good."95 The same
month, the government published a list of "Unacceptable Behaviours" that, if
committed, could lead to exclusion or deportation. Items on this list include
"public speaking including preaching; running [an extremist] website," and

89. Pamela Constable, Divisive Scholar Draws Parallels Between Islam and Democracy,
WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2007, at B6; see also ACLU, THE EXCLUDED: IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION
AND THE WAR OF IDEAS 11 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/safefree/the_
excluded report.pdf (noting that Ramadan's exclusion had initially been justified by the
government on the ground that he "endorsed or espoused terrorism"). Ramadan's exclusion was
later justified under a different statutory provision. See Olivier Guitta, The State Dept. Was Right,
WEEKLY STANDARD, Oct. 16, 2006, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/
000/012/800naxnt.asp ("[Tihe State Department denied a visa to Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan on
the grounds that he had contributed around 600 euros to a French charity classified as a terrorist
organization....").
90. See Guitta, supra note 89 ("Ramadan holds out Islam as the solution to all the problems of
Muslim youth .... ). Ramadan himself attributed the exclusion to political differences. See Tariq
Ramadan, Op-Ed., Why I'm Banned in the USA, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2006, at BI ("I am
increasingly convinced that the Bush administration has barred me for a much simpler reason: It
doesn't care for my political views."). Ramadan was subsequently admitted into and entered the
United States. See Am. Acad. Religion v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 115, 134-39 (2d Cir. 2009)
(vacating and remanding the initial refusal based on a possible procedural flaw in the consular
decision); Kirk Semple, At Last Allowed, Muslim Scholar Visits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at A29.
91. Jonathan Birt, Good Imam, Bad Imam: Civic Religion and National Integration in Britain
Post-9/11, 96 MUSLIM WORLD 687, 694-95 (2006).
92. Id. at 698.
93. Ben Saul, Speaking of Terror: CriminalisingIncitement to Violence, 28 U. NEW S. WALES
L.J. 868, 870 (2005).
94. Alan Cowell, Britain Deports Man Accused of Ties to Attacker in '05 Bombing, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2007, at A7.
95. Alan Travis et al., Clarke Uses 'Personal Power' to Ban Bakri from UK, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), Aug. 13, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/aug/13/terrorism.syria?INTCMP=
SRCH.
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expressing viewpoints that "foster hatred which might lead to intercommunity violence in the UK." 9 6 Enforcement of such rules means that
government officials have to make decisions about what kinds of religious
speech will "foster" hatred or "foment" violence. In so doing, they must
make judgments about how a community of co-religionists will likely
interpret religious speech or doctrine. This plunges officials into the heart of
contested questions of religious epistemology.
The British government has also introduced a scheme of organization
proscription on ideological grounds. After the July 2005 attacks, the British
Parliament enacted legislation allowing the proscription of domestic organizations engaged in "unlawful glorification of the commission or preparation
(whether in the past, in the future or generally) of acts of terrorism," and
organizations "associated with statements containing any such
glorification."97 After the publication of cartoons caricaturing religious figures by the Danish newspaper Jyllens-Posten in September 2005, the British
government outlawed two organizations-al Ghurabaa and al Firquat unNassjiyah (also known as the Saved Sect)-that organized protests at which
individual protesters waved death threats against the cartoonists.
On
issuing the bans, the Home Office explained that both groups had
"disseminate[d] materials that glorify acts of terrorism." 99
D. Conclusion
Pressure to interdict terrorist conspiracies at a safe time and distance
before their completion and a growing concern about homegrown plots
create new challenges for law enforcement in both the United States and the
United Kingdom. The most pressing challenge is the informational asymmetry that characterizes many terrorism prosecutions. 100 Prosecutors bridge
this gap by relying on religious speech. It is also plausible to suppose that
religious speech serves a signaling function at an investigative stage. Not all

96. COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL

TERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM'S STRATEGY

12

(2006), available at http://www.iwar.org.uk/homesec/resources/uk-threat-level/uk-counterterrorismstrategy.pdf.
97. Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 21 (emphasis added). In the same provision, glorification is
defined to "include[] any form of praise or celebration." Id; cf Saul, supra note 93, at 879
(describing a similar scheme introduced by the Howard government in Australia).
98. Press Release, Home Office, Home Office to Ban Terror Groups (July 17, 2006), available
at http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/press-releases/ban-terror-groups; see also Ian Cobain et al.,
Reborn Extremist Sect Had Key Role in London Protest, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 11, 2006, at 14;

Neil McKay, How the Fire Spread, SUNDAY HERALD, Feb. 12, 2006, at 37 (describing the groups'
role in the cartoon controversy); Alan Travis, Reid Uses New Laws to Ban Two Islamist Groups for

'Glorifying Terrorism,' GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 18, 2006, at 9 (reporting on the ban).
99. U.K. HOME OFFICE, PROSCRIBED TERRORIST GROUPS 2-3, 6 (2010), available at
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terroism/proscribed-terror-groups/proscribedgroups?view-Binary.
100. See supra subpart II(A).
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enforcement actions will end, however, in criminal prosecutions that rely on
religious speech. Hence, looking at prosecutions alone to determine the extent of state reliance on religious speech likely yields an undercount.
A caveat is warranted here. The phenomenon described here-reliance
on religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism-is not the same as the
practice of discriminatory policing based on racial or religious identity. My
narrow claim here is that law enforcement entities have addressed the
uniquely difficult problem of informational asymmetry in terrorism
investigations by turning to religious speech as a plausible signal of and
proxy for terrorist intent. That claim does not in any way rest on the distinct
and different proposition that law enforcement entities in the United States or
the United Kingdom operate on the basis of invidious biases. 01 But nor
should I be taken to imply an absence of animus. For the purposes of this
Article, I am rather concerned with how the information-poor environment in
which terrorist entities such as al Qaeda operate pushes law enforcement to
use religious speech as a signal, or proxy, for unlawful intentions.
III. Constitutional Implications of the Use of Religious Speech as a
Counterterrorism Signal
This Part focuses on the central question of constitutional law raised by
the policies described in Part II: Under existing U.S. constitutional doctrine,
does law enforcement reliance on religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism work violate the First Amendment and in particular its
Religion Clauses? First Amendment doctrine recognizes the possibility of
two harms from reliance on religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism
enforcement. First, individuals may experience a chilling effect on speech
and association. Second, religious communities may be burdened by constraints on their autonomy to debate and cultivate unique, distinctive
religious views. This Part focuses on the second harm, which involves the
epistemic autonomy of religious communities. I argue that current constitutional doctrine provides no constraining mechanism or remedy in response to
those harms. In Lawrence Sager's phrasing, the constitutional norms in play
here are "underenforced," so that "only a small part of the universe of
plausible claims . .. is seriously considered by the federal courts."l 0 2 I first
briefly describe two harms and then focus on the doctrinal protection of the
epistemic autonomy interest. I conclude that the formal doctrine offers few
protective resources for this species of religious liberty interest.

101. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling Became the Law of the Land: United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering,
98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1035-36 (2010) (analyzing the "[r]esurgence" of racial profiling in
counterterrorism, based largely on law enforcement's biases against individuals who appear to be
Arab).
102. Sager, supra note 19, at 1216.
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A. How Does the Signaling Function of Religious Speech Harm First
Amendment Interests?
Government use of religious speech as a signal in domestic
counterterrorism impinges on First Amendment interests in two ways. One
implicates individual interests; the other concerns a collective interest of religious communities in epistemic autonomy, i.e., the freedom to define and
revise faith understandings and doctrine without interference by the state.
First, government's reliance on religious speech directly affects
individuals. By relying on religious speech as a basis for discerning private
actors who merit punishment, government raises the public cost of using religious speech (i.e., by increasing the possibility of being targeted for
investigation on the basis of that speech). Hence, it creates an incentive to
use nonreligious speech. Reliance on religious speech as a signal has the
potential as a result to chill individuals' constitutionally protected speech.
Because that speech concerns matters at the core of many individuals' understanding of their identity, a chilling effect will impinge on "individual
autonomy understood as the practical power to choose one's ends" 03 that is
at the heart of some conceptions of the speech and association components of
the First Amendment.
An additional stigmatic harm might be imagined. It is plausible that
government reliance on religious speech in counterterrorism also could inflict
"pervasive dignitary and stigmatic harms"l 04 on individuals by sending the
message that members of a minority religious group are "presumptively
disloyal and unworthy of empathy" 0 5 and by "discrediting [its members']
participation in civil culture" through claims framed in religious terms.1 06
Yet if the constitutional significance of religious speech's signaling
function were exhausted by its impact upon individuals targeted for enforcement actions, then the constitutional costs would seem to be few. No general
rule bars the government from using speech as evidence of either actus reus
or mens rea of a criminal offense.' 0 7 A religious element in speech, the

103. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 144, 178 (2003).
104. Murad Hussein, Note, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group Harm in
Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (2008).
105. Id. at 938.

106. Id.
107. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 489 (1993) ("The First Amendment ... does not
prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or
intent."); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME & THE USES OF LANGUAGE 79-126 (1989)

(discussing agreements to commit crimes, criminal threats, and inducements to crime). But see
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581-91 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (expressing doubt
that speech should be treated as an actus reus).
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Supreme Court has instructed, does not change this analysis.'os Any
infringement of religious liberty would be an incidental byproduct of an otherwise legitimate enforcement action that triggers no free exercise concern.
Further, reliance on religious speech as a signal in domestic counterterrorism
entails no outright ban or direct burden on speech, no viewpoint-based
distinction, and no content-based regulation.109 The individual constitutional
interests burdened by the use of religious speech as a counterterrorism signal
thus seem at least tolerable given the magnitude of the countervailing state
interest.
But the second harm to First Amendment interests, while more unusual,
raises complex questions with potentially greater normative heft. This
second harm sounds in the Religion Clauses rather than the free speech part
of the First Amendment. It is more unusual because the affected interest (in
epistemic autonomy) belongs to groups, rather than individuals, and is linked
less directly to governmental reliance on religious speech. The interest at
stake here is the shared, collective interest that a religious community has in
determining the content and direction of its religious beliefs without
interference by the government. Call this the interest that a religious
community has in epistemic autonomy.
Religious communities have a collective interest in epistemic autonomy.
This encompasses control over the form and content of canonical religious
texts such as the Bible, a point of considerable controversy in the history of
American schooling. 1 o It entails the right of a religious community to form
and revise collective understandings of its own faith, free of state
interference. And it may reach the right of minority communities to protect
their children from the perceived corrupting influences of public
education."' Epistemic autonomy, while somewhat conceptually elusive,
108. See Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94,
109 (1952) ("Legislative power to punish subversive action cannot be doubted. If such action
should be actually attempted by a cleric, neither his robe nor his pulpit would be a defense.").
109. Cf N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (upholding
basic rights of the press to prevail over a statute supposedly permitting prior restraint); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("Viewpoint discrimination is thus
an egregious form of content discrimination."); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)
(recognizing content-based regulations of speech as "presumptively invalid").
110. Catholics and Protestants in the United States have long clashed over the proper translation
of the Bible. John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A PoliticalHistory of the Establishment Clause,

100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 299-300 (2001). Even the text of the Ten Commandments is subject to
debate. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 717-18 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There are
many distinctive versions of the Decalogue, ascribed to by different religions and even different
denominations within a particular faith; to a pious and learned observer, these differences may be of
enormous religious significance.").
11l. For Catholic concerns along these lines, see Sarah Barrington Gordon, "Free" Religion
and "Captive" Schools: Protestants, Catholics, and Education, 1945-1965, 56 DEPAUL L. REv.

1177, 1183 (2007). For Evangelical concerns, see Stanley Fish, Children and the FirstAmendment,
29 CoNN. L. REV. 883, 886-88 (1997) (chronicling the case of Mozert v. Hawkins, 582 F. Supp. 201
(E.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), in which an Evangelical Christian mother
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has in other words been a central battlefield for religious liberty in the
American twentieth century.
State reliance on religious speech as a signal in domestic
counterterrorism imperils the epistemic autonomy of certain religious
communities. When the government, in the course of a criminal or immigration proceeding, takes sides about the meaning of a religious text, or when it
takes a position about the entailments of some religious doctrine for practical
political action, it places a thumb on the scales of internal debate within the
religious community. It may in effect endorse one side's claims over
another's in a way that affects doctrinal development and changes the social
meaning of a religious term.'1 2 Or by indicating that some dogma or ideas
will be treated as almost per se evidence of illegal intentions-as the prayer
on Hayat's throat note was-the government may close off possible avenues
of debate. In so intervening, the state is of course not claiming an authoritative power to resolve hermeneutical disputes. Rather, the state is distorting
the free evolution of religious thought within a community by changing the
costs and benefits of certain doctrinal moves.
An illustration may be helpful here. Consider again the reception of
Hamid Hayat's trial and conviction among his co-religionists in California.
Hayat's trial was closely followed by his co-religionists. According to one
Sacramento-based Muslim community activist, "[t]he entire Muslim
community in Lodi is watching [the legal proceedings]."' 1 3 After having
followed Hayat's trial and conviction, Muslims in Southern California knew
that federal law enforcement authorities treated the throat note prayer as evidence of violent intent. As a result, they had a pro tanto reason not to use
that prayer, whether or not they accepted the Government's interpretation of
it as an endorsement of violence. Indeed that prayer is also commonly wom
in the form of a talisman to ward off daily misfortune.l1 4 (The Government's
trial witness, in other words, erred seriously in his reading.)" 5

sued to prevent her child from being made to read a textbook that exposed readers to a variety of
religious beliefs).
112. Cf

Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951

(1995) ("Any society or social context has what I call here social meanings-the semiotic content
attached to various actions, or inactions, or statuses, within a particular context.").
113. Carolyn Marshall, 24-Year Term for Californianin Terrorism Training Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 2007, at A20.
114. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 90 (noting the jury foreman's skepticism of the testimony
of a University of Oregon professor "who had testified that Pakistanis commonly carry a [Muslim
talisman called a] tawiz to ward off evil, much the way Jews place a mezuzah outside their door").
115. The prosecution's specific interpretation of the throat note was at a minimum highly
questionable. According to several experts, it was in fact "a traditional supplication . .. reported to
have been said by the Prophet [Mohammad] when he feared harm from a group of people." Id. In
her excellent reporting on the trial, Amy Waldman sought views from two experts (Bernard Haykel
and Ingrid Mattson) and a Pakistani New York Times reporter based in Islamabad and consulted
published and online collections of traditional Islamic prayers. All confirmed that the prosecution's
interpretation was incorrect.
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Notwithstanding this error, and without claiming power to issue an
authoritative interpretation, the state had signaled strongly to Hayat's coreligionists that the prayer would be deemed evidence of violent intent.
Another illustration-where the Government did not err in its
interpretation-is the Virginia case. 1 6 When the federal government used alTimimi's sermons as evidence of his dangerousness, his conviction catalyzed
changes to the way that Muslims in Northern Virginia self-identified and expressed their identity. According to one account, al-Timimi's arrest and
conviction seeded a "sense of beleaguerment among many Muslims in the
Washington area ... particularly" among groups close to al-Timimi's
mosque, disarming them in ongoing doctrinal fights with competing sectarian
factions.117 A Muslim community activist from that area told a journalist, "In
the past, people would say, 'I'm Salafi' [al-Timimi's denomination]. Now, I
never encounter people who say that."" 8 That is, the lesson of the al-Timimi
trial for Virginia Muslims was that to call oneself a "Salafi" was to invite
government scrutiny and possibly worse. The al-Timimi case suggests that a
religious community can be affected by the government's use of religious
speech as a signal whether or not the interpretation is erroneous.
B. ConstitutionalProtectionofReligious Epistemic Autonomy
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the epistemic autonomy
interest of religious communities in two strands of often-overlooked
precedent. In those lines of cases, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to shelter a religious community's
interest in defining and revising its own understanding of dogma and doctrine
and in fashioning its own normative commitments and epistemic criteria.
But these cases are now dated. Religion Clause doctrine has shifted. Even
though precedent on epistemic autonomy has not formally been revisited, the
question may fairly be asked: Do these precedents still imply judicial protection for religious communities' free normative development? Or are they
outmoded outliers of another era, yielding little comfort or shelter from contemporary pressures on First Amendment values?
1. The Protection of Epistemic Autonomy Under the Religion
Clauses.-The two lines of Religion Clause precedent both arise out of
disputed dispositions of religious institutions' property after a schism had
ruptured an originally unitary church. Both lines of cases rely upon
Establishment Clause and also Free Exercise Clause concerns.

116. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
117. Caryle Murphy, For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge, WASH. POST,
Sept. 5, 2006, at Al.

118. Id.

856

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 89:833

In the first set of cases, the Court cautioned against inquiries into the
fidelity of one side or another to original church doctrine. It did so in terms
anticipating and prefiguring a later Establishment Clause rule against state
"endorsement" of certain religious positions.1 9 This anti-endorsement strand
of religious epistemic autonomy emerged first in nineteenth-century case law
concerning church property division. A clear prohibition on state endorsement of religious orthodoxy emerged only after 1950.
In the 1871 case Watson v. Jones,'2 0 the Court intimated a concern for
epistemic autonomy when it delineated a three-part framework for resolving
disputes about the disposition of church property.121 First, if a case involved
an express trust that stipulated fidelity to church doctrine, that trust would be
enforced.1 2 2 Second, in cases concerned with independent congregations that
lacked hierarchal arrangements, "the rights of such bodies . .. [would] be
determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary
associations." 23 Finally, the Court explained that in cases involving
hierarchical churches, the decision of the "highest of. . . church judicatories"
would be respected.12 4 Sounding constitutional overtones, the Court
explained that these three options protected "the full and free right to
entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach
any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and
property." 25
Yet within a year of Watson, the Court was meddling again in the
internal affairs of religious bodies. It first cautioned that judicial respect for
churches' internal decision making would be obtained only if a church

119. The idea of endorsement was first suggested by Justice O'Connor and later picked up by
other Justices. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asking
whether the state had impermissibly "sen[t] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community"); see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU,
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592-94 (1989) (engaging in an endorsement analysis
based on Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch). Justice O'Connor later explained that the
endorsement analysis is applied from the perspective of a "reasonable observer." Capitol Square
Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779-80 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
121. Id. at 722-28.
122. Id. at 722.
123. Id. at 725.
124. Id at 727; see also I KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE
EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS 263-65 (2006) (discussing the Court's grouping of questions concerning

the rights to church properties into three categories, including a category for when a congregation is
subordinate to a larger church organization); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Offl Civil Court Involvement
in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1847-52 (1998) (describing Watson

comprehensively).
125. Watson, 80 U.S. at 728.
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abided by its own procedures.1 26 In 1929, the Court identified three
exceptions to Watson for "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness."1 2 7 In practical
effect, these exceptions invited lower tribunals to interrogate churches'
internal decision making based on allegations that a decision was "arbitrary"
or inconsistent without guidance as to how that standard would be applied to
the peculiar context of religious associations. The invitation was not
ignored.128
Only after World War II did the Court revisit its conflicting instructions.
In cases decided in 1952 and 1960, the Court created a zone of decisional
autonomy for ecclesiastical bodies. In those cases, it held that neither New
York's legislature nor its courts could displace the governing body of the
Russian Orthodox Church based on allegations that the latter had fallen under
Soviet control.12 9 In 1969, the Court invalidated a Georgia state court decision because the state tribunal had relied on a state law rule that church
property remained in the trust of a larger ecclesiastical entity provided that
the entity did not "depart substantially from prior doctrine." 30 Recognizing
the potential collision between arbitrariness review and desire to show respect for the unpredictable pathways of religious thinking, the Court opted
for the latter. In 1976, the Court held that courts could not review ecclesiastical authorities' decisions to determine whether they were "arbitrary."'31
The Court rested this judgment on the perceived risk that state intervention
might "inhibit[] the free development of religious doctrine" by placing a
thumb on the scales of doctrinal debate.132
126. See, e.g., Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872) (holding that a
majority rule would be followed for congregational churches provided that the majority "adhere to
the organization and to the doctrines" of the church).
127. Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929).
128. See, e.g., Brundage v. Deardorf, 55 F. 839, 847-48 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1893) (stating that
only "a bona fide decision" of an ecclesiastical tribunal would be recognized); Note, Judicial
Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J.

1113, 1119 n.32 (1965) (collecting cases).
129. For legislatures, see Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedralof the Russian Orthodox Church,

344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952) ("Even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident
from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls."). For
courts, see Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S. 190,

190-91 (1960) (per curiam) (holding that a state court could not deny a "right conferred under
canon law").
130. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
440, 450 (1969). Akin to the arbitrariness exception, the "departure-from-doctrine" rule invited
judicial scrutiny into church doctrine. Id.
131. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712-16 (1976). While courts
can still inquire into "fraud" or "collusion," the continuing validity of these exceptions to the
general rule of noninquiry into church decision making is uncertain. See Douglas Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1397 (1981) (citing cases where state courts

relying on fraud exceptions were reversed and commenting that such exceptions do not fit the
Court's broad rationale).
132. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 449.
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Like the endorsement test subsequently to be developed by Justice
O'Connor, the final version of this rule aimed at barring the state from
"send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community."1 3 3 Whereas the church property cases concerned the play of
factions within a religious community, Justice O'Connor's endorsement test
focused on the interaction of religious minorities with the larger society.
Both church-property cases and the endorsement rule, nevertheless, have the
purpose and effect of keeping the state clear of intramural sectarian disputes
and preserving a communal right to religious self-determination.
The second relevant line of cases under the Religion Clauses prohibits
judicial inquiry into religious doctrine. Again, this line of cases anticipates
an idea in later Establishment Clause jurisprudence-the "entanglement"
test.134 This "anti-entanglement" rule differs from the anti-endorsement
strand of church-property case law because it concerns the method and not
the consequence of judicial inquiry.' 3 5 That is, it does not speak to the results
or effects of state action. Rather it limits the manner in which the state-a
court or another decision maker-may resolve a dispute linked to the
epistemic life of a religious community.
This second line of precedent also emerged out of church-property
disputes. 13 6 In 1969, the Court had invalidated the Georgia state law rule that
a general church held a local church's property in implicit trust "on the sole
condition that the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice
existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches."137 In the course of
its decision, the Court observed that this test forced "[a] court . .. of
necessity [to] make its own interpretation of the meaning of church doctrine"
by "assessing the relative significance to the religion of the tenets."1 3 8 No
constitutionally permissible space obtained, in the Court's opinion, for courts

133. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860-61 (2005) (describing a showing of
government purpose to favor one religion over another or adherence to religion generally as a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders); supra note 119.
134. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615-23 (1971) (applying the entanglement
test); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa.").
135. For instance, the Court has expressed concern that a tax regulation requiring the IRS to
differentiate "secular" from "religious" benefits might lead to entangling inquiries. Hernandez v.
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 694 (1989).
136. Entanglement captures at least three different concerns: excessive state aid, excessive
surveillance, and the fostering of divisive political competition on religious lines. Laycock, supra
note 131, at 1392-94.
137. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull, 393 U.S. at 443.

138. Id. at 450.
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to engage in the "interpretation of particular church doctrines and the
importance of those doctrines to the religion."' 39
Seven years later, the Court elaborated on that hint. In a 1976 decision,
the Court squarely prohibited "detailed review" of ecclesiastical decision
making in the course of determining whether a decision was "arbitrary."l 4 0
In language colored by a concern for religious institutions' epistemic
autonomy, the Court cautioned that the First Amendment "commits
exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals"' resolution of
"quintessentially religious controversies."l 4 1 Both cases tracked concerns
expressed in other Establishment Clause case law about "[tlhe prospect of
church and state litigating in court about what does or does not have religious
meaning." 42 That concern was one elaborated and generalized in the antientanglement test for Establishment Clause violations set forth in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.14 3 Epistemic autonomy protection, that is, prefigured the general
contours of Religion Clause jurisprudence in more ways than one.
2. The Erosion of Epistemic Autonomy.-These two lines of cases date
largely from the Warren and early Burger courts. But the Court's view of the
Religion Clauses has changed dramatically since then.144 The changes have
undermined the intellectual foundations of case law protecting epistemic
autonomy.145

139. Id Justice Brennan referred opaquely to the First Amendment as a source for this rule,
citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Id at 449.
140. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 718 (1976).
141. Id. at 720. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull and Serbian Eastern Orthodox were subsequently

confirmed in Jones v. Wolf 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979). See also Md. & Va. Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per curiam)
(dismissing an appeal because "the Maryland court's resolution of the dispute involved no inquiry
into religious doctrine").
142. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977).
143. See 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (stating that "[a] law may be one 'respecting' the
[establishment of religion] while falling short of its total realization" because the concern is to avoid
"foster[ing] an 'excessive government entanglement with religion' (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970))).
144. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 146

(2004) ("In a brief decade and a half, we have moved from expansive readings of both of the
religious clauses to narrow readings of the Free Exercise Clause and of very important aspects of
the Establishment Clause.").
145. I assume here the widely shared view of constitutional doctrine as implementing the
Constitution's values through a sequence of judicially crafted doctrinal rules that respond to
institutional limitations and changing circumstances. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court,
1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1975) ("[A]

surprising amount of what passes as authoritative constitutional 'interpretation' is best understood
as . .. a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and
authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions . . . ."); David A. Strauss,
Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Cm. L. REv. 877, 885 (1996) ("[O]ur written

constitution has ... become part of an evolutionary common law system, and the common
law .. . provides the best way to understand the practices of American constitutional law.").
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In its interpretation of both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses, the Court has veered away from treating religion and religious disputation as exceptional human activities that are unique and beyond the
proper purview of state authority. It has also increasingly resisted the idea
that religion warrants separate and special treatment. Instead it has moved
toward a view of religion as singular only because it is historically vulnerable
to invidious discrimination. 146 As a result, the Court typically finds no
Religion Clause violation unless religious persons or beliefs are facially
singled out for discriminatory treatment. 14 7 Disparate-effect claims, by
contrast, have not fared well. The emphasis on formal equality leaves less
room for concepts of separation or concerns about epistemic autonomy.
The landmark case of Employment Division v. Smith 48 transformed the
Free Exercise Clause's protection from a right against laws that burden religious liberty to a rule against facial discrimination. 149 In Smith the Court
held that neutral laws of general applicability are valid under the Free
Exercise Clause regardless of their burden on religious liberty.'5s In practical
effect, Smith established a weak equality rule that is satisfied in all but the
small set of cases in which legislators are foolish enough to flout facial
In most instances, it will be
neutrality (or almost-facial neutrality). 15'
feasible to mask impermissible motives.
Moreover, the Court's sensitivity to anti-endorsement and antientanglement concerns has also diminished. Three trends in recent doctrine,
palpable largely in Establishment Clause cases, undermine the claim that
state action is unconstitutional if it impinges on a religious group's autonomy
and communicates a view about internal doctrinal debates. Coupled with
Smith's relaxed view of Free Exercise protections, these Establishment

146. See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment

Clause, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 694-706 (2002) (chronicling the shift toward minority protection in
religious free-expression cases).
147. See Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1264 (2008) (referencing
the general agreement that the government cannot target individual religious groups in regulations,
barring extraordinary circumstances). But cf Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1987) (finding an exception to
Title VII for religious groups).
148. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
149. Id. at 879; accord Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 531-32, 546 (1993) (holding that a "law burdening religious practice that is neither neutral nor
of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny"). For early criticism of Smith,
see Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 10-23; Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 138-39 (1992).

150. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882; see also Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 536 (applying this rule).
151. The relevant Supreme Court precedent for this proposition, Lukumi Babalu Aye, is an
outlier. In that case, the social and historical context of the local ordinance at issue could not have
been more thoroughly imbricated with evidence of animus against a classically discrete, insular, and
unpopular minority. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 526-27. The social meaning of a law will not
necessarily be so obvious.
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Clause trends mark a retreat from vigorous protection of epistemic religious
autonomy.
First, the Court is less sensitive about government action that takes a
position on religious meaning. It is less willing to intervene when the state
echoes and endorses a majoritarian preference on religion. In 2005, for
example, when the Court held that a Texas display of the Decalogue did not
violate the Establishment Clause, a plurality of Justices invoked tradition and
history as constitutionally sufficient justifications.152 Allowing inchoate
ideas of tradition to trump otherwise applicable Establishment Clause values
allows the state to take sides in important religious disputes if a historically
powerful majority faction endorses it. More generally, support within the
Court for Justice O'Connor's anti-endorsement test has waned.
Commentators criticize it as analytically incoherent and insufficiently
responsive to minority sensitivities.153 Justice Scalia has already set forth an
alternative view whereby government need not remain neutral between
religion and nonreligion but can "acknowledg[e] a single Creator."l 5 4 And a
plurality of the Court has recently indicated an openness to some kinds of
religious endorsement on the ground that "[t]he goal of avoiding
governmental endorsement does not require eradication of all religious
symbols in the public realm." 55 As the Court becomes less troubled by the
expressive effects of state action on religious matters, it becomes less likely
to take umbrage at the disruption of epistemic autonomy wrought by
counterterrorism enforcement actions.
Second, the Court, in another line of cases, has authorized state-funding
mechanisms that aggregate private choices in ways that set the state's imprimatur upon one religious practice or another. In so doing, the Court has
created another vehicle for majorities to give expressive effect to their reli-

152. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-92 (2005) (plurality opinion) (relying on
"unbroken history" as a warrant for display of the Decalogue on the grounds of the Texas State
Capitol); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26-30 (2004) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that expressive state action constituting "public recognition
of our Nation's religious history and character" ought to survive an Establishment Clause
challenge).
153. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 695-97 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing the
endorsement test). In the academic literature, endorsement has critics, see Feldman, supra note 146,
at 710-18 (arguing that endorsement does not protect against certain forms of exclusion but that
there is no reason religion should be singled out for endorsement-related protection), and putative
reformers, see Adam Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to Anti-sorting
Principles,2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 144-58.

154. McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 888-94 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1818 (2010) (plurality opinion). But see id. at 1832-33
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (applying the endorsement test). The Court further diluted the endorsement
test by suggesting that "text-based [public] monuments are almost certain to evoke different
thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different observers, and the effect of monuments that do not
contain text is likely to be even more variable." Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125,
1135 (2009).
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gious preferences. As a result, it has corroded a little further the doctrinal
grounds for treating incursions on epistemic autonomy as problematic. In
2002, the Court sanctioned government educational aid to parochial schools
on the condition that the aid is "neutral with respect to religion[] and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine
and independent private choice."' 56 Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist explained
this result by asserting that "numerous independent decisions of private
individuals" do not add up to any "imprimatur of government
endorsement." 57
But Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis is incomplete.
By
gerrymandering "private-choice" mechanisms, the state can easily endorse
one form of religious practice over others. The private-choice exception
thereby enables state endorsement and entrenchment of one religious group.
Neutrality at the level of individual choice does not entail neutrality in the
treatment of competing religious collectivities. For the state chooses in
which domains--education, health, prison services-private choice will be
made available. And it can use this choice for distributive ends. As Justice
Jackson pointed out in the first case incorporating the Establishment Clause
against the states, state funding for religious educational institutions
predictably aids certain faiths because only some sects maintain schools. 58
A foreseeable result is state aid predictably flowing to some religious
organizations, which can develop economies of scale, secure a larger market
share of the social service in question (e.g., education), and discourage other
faith groups from entering the same market.159 Deciding to introduce vouchers for schooling but not health care, hence, aids certain sects over others.
The possibility of private choice is not neutral as between religions. But the
Court to date has declined to register the risk that private-choice mechanisms

156. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 809-10 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that neutrality toward religious groups is
required to ensure that no endorsement of religion has occurred).
157. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 655.
158. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 20 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that an
aid program discriminated because the New Jersey scheme in question "authorize[d] disbursement
of... taxpayer's money ... to those who attend public schools and Catholic schools"). The extent
to which school vouchers, for example, can yield predictable effects over time is debated. See
Vincent Blasi, Vouchers and Steering, 18 J.L. & POL. 607, 619-20 (2002) (drawing attention to the
differing opinions about the long-term effects of vouchers on schools' independence). From early
in the twentieth century, the no-aid principle was intended to control distributional outcomes and to
stop financial distributions to Catholics. See Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 110, at 312-17 (describing
the evolution of Protestant and Jewish opposition to distributions to Catholics and the general public
secularist interest in limiting distributions in order to protect public education).
159. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal

Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 133, 141-45 (1996) (describing cooperationdefection differential between membership and nonmembership in religious groups and noting ways
the state can modify it).
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alter the market in religious beliefs.160 Nor is it willing to inquire into how a
private-choice scheme might be intentionally constructed so as to advantage
one sect over others. 161
Finally, although entanglement was initially one of three tests for
Establishment Clause violations, 16 2 the Court no longer applies a freestanding
In Agostini v. Felton,'6 the Court assimilated
entanglement test.163
"entanglement" into its analysis of a law's effect.'6 ' Entanglement is now a
second-order justification for declining to scrutinize closely a sectarian
recipient of state funds and hence a rationale for relaxing the judicial
regulation of private-choice programs recently endorsed by the Court.1 6 6 The
Court has also rejected challenges to substantial regulation of religious
entities' internal affairs in the course of general regulatory measures or the
disbursement of special benefits. 16 7

160. In Zelman, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the risk that financial incentives might
skew a program toward religious schools but concluded that so long as "neutral, secular" criteria
were used no constitutional problem obtained. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 653-54 & n.3 (noting in
addition that the Cleveland voucher program "in fact create[d] financial disincentives for religious
schools," which received less funding than community or magnet schools).
161. At the time of this writing, the Supreme Court has sub judice a challenge to an Arizona
school voucher system that raises a version of this concern. See Garriott v. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 3324
(2010); Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 3350 (2010) (both granting writ of
certiorari).
162. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also Kenneth F. Ripple, The
Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195, 1197-

98 (1980) (noting that entanglement was first articulated in Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664
(1970), but only designated as a separate Establishment Clause test in Lemon).
163. For past applications of entanglement, see, for example, New York v. CathedralAcad, 434
U.S. 125, 133 (1977), and Roemer v. Bd ofPub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 749-60 (1976).
164. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).

165. Id. at 232-33. Arguably, the end was visible earlier. See Ripple, supra note 162, at 120814. Agostini abandoned the idea that a prohibition on entanglement reflected a value distinct from
the no-aid and no-harm elements of the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter commented that
excessive focus on entanglement in Aguilar "obscured" constitutionally salient facts. Agostini, 521
U.S. at 242 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion) (stating that "inquiry
into the [state aid] recipient's religious views ... is not only unnecessary but also offensive"
because "courts should refrain from trolling through a person's or institution's religious beliefs").
The Mitchell plurality picked up a thread initially developed in cases concerning property-tax
exceptions and aid to tertiary educational institutions. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 748 n.15 ("The
importance of avoiding persistent and potentially frictional contact between governmental and
religious authorities is such that it has been held to justify the extension, rather than the withholding,
of certain benefits to religious organizations."); Walz, 397 U.S. at 691-92 & n. 12 (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (noting that state cessation of exemptions "might conflict with the demands of the Free
Exercise Clause").
167. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 394-95 (1990)
(holding that the administration and collection of a sales tax is not entangling); Hernandez v.
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 696-97 (1989) (holding that the monitoring of a tax benefit is not
entangling); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305-06 (1985) (holding
that the record-keeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act are not entangling).
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By contrast, judicial inquiry into religious belief is now commonplace.
Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), courts must ascertain
what constitutes a "substantial[] burden" on a person's "exercise of
religion."168 This test means that RFRA cases plunge courts into religious
exegesis.169 "[T]heological questions are begged throughout the testimony
and opinions" in RFRA cases.1 70 And judges "confidently assert[] the entire
and complete right of every American to believe as she or he chooses while
at the same time thoroughly enjoying arbitrating among competing views."' 7 '
The mere existence of the RFRA dilutes the force of entanglement concerns
because it makes entanglements a routine part of federal court litigation notionally aimed at protecting religious liberty.
Courts are becoming
acclimatized to such entanglement, which obviously no longer provides an
independent ground for invalidity on constitutional grounds.
Rather,
entanglement merely functions as a supernumerary factor in a constitutional
calculus driven by extrinsic considerations.
C. Conclusion
This Part began by identifying two constitutional harms to individuals
and religious communities respectively from the government's reliance on
religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism policing. It argued that these
harms are plausibly at stake each time the federal government relies on religious speech as a signal in counterterrorism. Nevertheless, the individual
harm, which takes the form of a chilling effect and an incursion on individual
dignity, is not a significant marginal cost beyond the necessary expenditures
of a criminal prosecution or other enforcement action. By contrast, the impact on a religious community's interest in epistemic autonomy-i.e., free
development of norms and beliefs independent of state interference-could
be substantial. Religion Clause doctrine, developed first in cases concerning
the state's treatment of religious property, recognizes and protects this
epistemic autonomy interest. But that doctrine has been corroded by changes
in Religion Clause doctrine. Epistemic autonomy is now unlikely to command substantial respect or protection in the federal courts. The government

168. 42 U.S.C § 2000bb-1 (2006); see also id. § 2000cc-5(7) (providing that a practice need not
be "central to" a religion to be an "exercise of religion"). A unanimous Supreme Court endorsed
this test in 2006 as applied to the federal government. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente
Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 & n. 1(2006).
169. Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 444-49 (1998)
[hereinafter Sullivan, Judging Religion]. Sullivan argues for "the impossibility of fairly delimiting
the contours of contemporary religious life" in light of the thick multitude of localized religious
"folkways" that characterize religious life in the United States. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN,
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 146, 153 (2005) [hereinafter SULLIVAN,
IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM].

170. Sullivan, Judging Religion, supra note 169, at 448-49.
171. SULLIVAN, IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 169, at 6; accord Sullivan,
Judging Religion, supra note 169, at 448-49.
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has little reason to factor in the costs to free speech or religious autonomy
interests when it designs its policy responses to domestic terrorism.
This is not an unfamiliar result. Doctrine falls short of full specification
or protection of constitutional norms for many reasons, 172 including a
Thayerian respect for legislative judgment or other "institutional
concerns."173 More importantly, the result of the analysis of this Part accords
with the general approach taken by courts to constitutional rights imperiled
by novel security policies adopted in the wake of the September 11 attacks.
Courts have not emerged as robust defenders of individual liberties post9/11. Even in areas in which judicial pushback has been seemingly robust,
such as in the exercise of habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Supreme Court's
position may amount to more rhetoric than substance. 17 4 In part, this may be
because the Court has long been reluctant to regulate investigatory,
prosecutorial, and immigration discretion, even when core constitutional
liberty interests are at issue.175 Confrontations with law enforcement tend to
And these costs will be
be costly for the court's public reputation.'
especially high in the wake of 9/11.
Further, judicial responses to national security have not been
acoustically separated from other bodies of law. "[T]here is nothing sui
generis" about the federal bench's responses to post-9/11 security policies.177
Judicial responses to post-9/11 policies echo federal courts' approaches to
other complex state institutions with rights implications.' 7 8 At the same time,
the increasing concern for security bleeds over into other doctrinal areas,
weakening rights protections that are only tangentially related to terrorism

172. But see Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialismand Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM. L.

REV. 857, 924 (1999) (arguing for a theory of "remedial equilibration" that "leaves no room for a
distinction between the abstract, analytic definitions of constitutional rights and remedial concerns
that prevent courts from enforcing those rights to their 'true' limits").
173. Sager, supra note 19, at 1222-27.
174. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 431 (2010)
(questioning the effect of the Supreme Court's interventions related to Guantanamo).
175. See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 260 (2006) (holding that, for a retaliatoryprosecution case, once a claimant has made a prima facie showing of retaliatory harm, if the
defendant official can show that "retaliation was not the but-for cause of the discharge, the claim
fails for lack of causal connection between unconstitutional motive and resulting harm, despite
proof of some retaliatory animus in the official's mind"); Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (holding that the doctrine of constitutional doubt does not require
that 28 U.S.C. § 1252(g) be interpreted to permit immediate review of a respondent's selectiveenforcement claim); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 462 (1996) (holding that Rule
16(a)(1)(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require the government to permit
discovery of documents material to the "defense" of a selective-prosecution claim).
176. For example, the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases provided a centerpiece for
Richard Nixon's presidential campaign, which in turn led to a change in the Court's personnel and
thus direction. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 410
(2002).
177. Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 226.

178. Id. at 257-65.
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risk.17 9 Consider the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In
recent cases, the Court has made it easier for law enforcement to demand
and to secure waivers of the right in custodial
identification'
interrogations.' 8 ' By extension, it might be predicted that the judicial
response to 9/11 will only weaken religious liberty interests.
Finally, there is little public or political pressure on the courts to
recognize and remedy harms from the signaling function of religious speech.
Public concern about counterterrorism law enforcement (to the extent that it
exists) generally focuses on prosecutorial or enforcement actions that discriminate on racial or religious grounds.182 Discriminatory enforcement and
profiling are familiar and resonant criticisms of American law
They are politically potent and recognizable, albeit
enforcement. 83
intractable.1 84 By contrast, the effects of using religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism enforcement are neither easy to identify nor plainly visible.
The practice is partially buried in enforcement protocols. It generally comes
to public attention only sporadically in geographically and temporally dispersed criminal trials. Reliance on religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism is as a result unlikely to precipitate public outrage or pressure for reform either by legislation or through interest-group litigation. 85

179. See, e.g., id at 267-72 (discussing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), as an
example of the impact of security concerns on transsubstantive rules, such as civil pleading
requirements).
180. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 190-91 (2004) (upholding a
state statute requiring a person stopped by the police to produce identification documents).
181. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2262-63 (2010) (finding a waiver of the
right against self-incrimination based on a one-word answer given after two hours and forty-five
minutes of silence in the face of questions).
182. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 4, at 1415 (defining "racial profiling"-at least the
kind that provokes public outrage-as "whenever a law enforcement officer questions, stops,
arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a person" because of his or her racial or ethnic
background).
183. See, e.g., Michael R. Smith, DepoliticizingRacial Profiling:Suggestions for the Limited
Use and Management of Race in Police Decision-Making, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 219, 219

(2005) (highlighting the growth of the term racialprofiling from "a term virtually unheard of five
years ago" to a "part of the national lexicon").
184. The Hayat case was criticized by the Muslim community of Lodi, California, where Hayat
lived, as an instance of discrimination-not as a failure of interpretation. MacFarquhar, supra
note 39.
185. Commentators from across the political spectrum noted the lack of public reaction to the
trial of Ali al-Timimi. See, e.g., Debra Erdley, Al-Timimi Verdict Turning Point in Legal War on

Terror, TRIBLIVE NEWS, May 1, 2005, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/s
329818.html (quoting a defense attorney in saying that the Muslim community "seem[s] resigned to
what's going on" and that they no longer expect fair trials); Daniel Pipes, Convicting [Ali alTimimi,] the "PaintballSheikh," DANIELPIPES.COM (May 2, 2005), http://www.danielpipes.org/

2579/convicting-ali-al-timimi-the-paintball-sheikh (observing that "the mainstream media stayed
resolutely away from the case").
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Whatever harm flows from the practice will instead be externalized onto the
relevant minority religious community.-86
IV. Selecting the Optimal Signal for Domestic Counterterrorism
Government recourse to religious speech as a proxy in domestic
counterterrorism may not collide with constitutional doctrine, but does it
provide an efficient signaling mechanism? This Part switches from a legal,
doctrinal lens to an institutional- and policy-design inquiry. It considers
whether law enforcement entities indeed have lighted on the optimal signal
for their aims. Recall that prosecutors and police turned to religious speech
relatively quickly after 9/11.187 To minimize search time and costs, they may
have grasped the most readily available and the most obvious signal. If executive officials came to rely on religious speech by default as the most
obvious tool at hand, then officials may not have considered the full range of
possible signaling options. Moreover, legislators and executive officials did
not benefit from the new empirical research into the dynamics of terrorism
that emerged after 9/11. At a minimum, therefore, the circumstances under
which religious speech was adopted as a signaling device should counsel for
caution. Religious speech may not in fact be the most efficient signal for resolving epistemic uncertainties in domestic counterterrorism.
This Part analyzes two reasons for questioning reliance on the signaling
function of religious speech. It further suggests that governments may be
better off eschewing such reliance and turning instead to a closer study of
suspects' associations to resolve the signaling problem. The first reason is
institutional: Government interpretation of religious speech is likely to be
characterized by a high error rate because of the relative lack of institutional
knowledge, the predictable incentives of law enforcement officials, and the
semantic complexity of religious speech. The discrete interpretative error
manifested in Hayat's case, 188 that is, is probably not an outlier.
Second, religious speech may not, in any event, be the optimal signal
for terrorism-association may be a better signal. There is a rich and
increasingly sophisticated empirical literature about terrorism that casts some
light on the signaling question. It suggests that religious speech or conduct
plays only a tangential role in the etiology of terrorism. Its inconsistent incidence in terrorism cases provides scant basis for inferring the correlation that
current government practice presupposes. To the contrary, the empirical and

186. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text; cf Floyd D. Weatherspoon, Racial
ProfilingofAfrican-American Males: Stopped, Searched, andStripped of ConstitutionalProtection,
38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 439, 459 n.125 (2004) (summarizing congressional findings that racial
profiling causes members of minority communities to "experience fear, anxiety, humiliation, anger,
resentment, and cynicism when they are unjustifiably treated as criminal suspects").
187. See supra Part II.
188. See supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
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social science literature suggests that a terrorist's path generally passes
through what Louise Richardson calls a "complicit surround":189 an insular
group with distinctive, even idiosyncratic, normative and ethical characteristics that influence the individual turn to political violence. There is
surprising convergence on this finding. While its validity should remain
open to new challenges based on new empirical evidence, there is sufficient
consensus in the literature to suggest that it is certain forms of association,
and not religious speech, that will be correlated with terrorism. At a
minimum, this casts current counterterrorism practice into doubt. Moreover,
it suggests that law enforcement should reorient toward the mapping and understanding of social networks and away from a preoccupation with religious
speech. This Part concludes by considering what it would entail for law enforcement entities to retool their reliance on religious speech as a signal in
counterterrorism.
A. The ErrorRate in CurrentSignaling Practice
Even if religious speech provides an accurate signal for
counterterrorism, it may be better for the state to use a different signal. This
will be the case if the government cannot operationalize the correlation between religious speech and risk. Indeed, it is likely that the government will
have high error rates in handling religious speech for three separate reasons.
First, religious speech is more complex and liable to misunderstanding than
other nonreligious discourses. Second, in the American context there has
been little state investment in developing a competency in religious
interpretation. To the contrary, constitutional theorists and scholars have
long insisted on the incompetence of the state in religious matters, providing
an affirmative reason for not investing in such expertise. By now, this may
have become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Finally, the distribution of incentives
within policing and prosecutorial institutions will predictably increase the
rate of error. These three reasons suggest that religious speech may not be an
optimal signal for our government even if it might be an effective tool in the
hands of some ideal government.
First, the risk of interpretive error is especially high with respect to
religious speech because of its origins and nature. In the three main
monotheistic faiths, most religious texts, doctrine, and dogma have survived
centuries or more. Over extended use in different cultural and historical
circumstances, they have accrued multiple and potentially inconsistent
meanings. It is possible that religious texts must be especially open textured
and receptive to reinterpretation and reappropriation if they are to maintain
their relevance through changing times (because if they are not, they fall out

189. LouiSE RICHARDSON, WHAT TERRORISTS WANT: UNDERSTANDING
CONTAINING THE THREAT 49 (2006).

THE ENEMY,
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of use).190 That is, there may be a selection effect that favors hermeneutic
malleability. Even without adopting an ambitious account of religious texts'
evolution, it still seems plausible to posit that as a general matter, religious
texts are likely to be more semantically elastic than the mine run of normative or political vocabulary.
By way of example, consider the word jihad.19' An Arabic word
literally meaning "striving," the term jihad is used in the Koran to refer in
some places "to disputation and efforts made for the sake of God and in his
cause" and, in other places, to the conduct of war related to the exercise of a
communal duty. 192 In the seventh century, the term evolved into a referent
for a larger body of legal doctrine analogous tojus in bello and jus ad bellum
in the Western legal tradition. 19 3 More modem jurists, however, propounded
94
another, much more expansive, understanding of jihad to justify terrorism.'
They draw on another distinctive strand of theological thought beginning
with the thirteenth century Damascus-based scholar Taqi-d-din Ahmad ibnTaymiyya.19 5 By contrast, yet another denomination, the ascetic Sufi
tradition, uses the term "greater Holy War" (i.e., jihad) to describe the
"constant struggle against the nafs, the 'soul'-the lower self, the base

190. Cf Michael Pye, Problems of Method in the Interpretation of Religion, 1 JAPANESE J.
RELIGIOUS STUD. 107, 120-21 (1974) ("All sophisticated religions experience some degree of
tension between the doctrinal norms and formulations which they have inherited and the changing
needs of the times. This results in a constant string of new interpretations.").
191. See MICHAEL BONNER, JIHAD IN ISLAMIC HISTORY: DOCTRINES AND PRACTICE 1-2

(2006) (summarizing the different interpretations of the word).
192. Id. at 2, 21; see also Fred M. Donner, The Sources of Islamic Conceptions of War ("The
Qur'an makes... frequent reference to 'struggle' or striving[] (jihad and other derivations), by
which physical confrontation or fighting appears often-but not always-to be intended."), in JUST
WAR AND JIHAD: HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON WAR AND PEACE IN
WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS 31, 46 (John Kelsay & James Turner Johnson eds., 1991).
193. BONNER, supra note 191, at 3 ("A typical Book of Jihad [within a larger work of
jurisprudence] includes the law governing the conduct of war, which covers treatment of
nonbelligerents, division of spoils among the victors, and such matters."); Donner, supra note 192,
at 52 (describing the development of Islamic jus in bello rules).
194. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE PLACE OF TOLERANCE IN ISLAM 11-13 (2002)
(describing the "literal[] and ahistorical[]" Koranic readings used to justify terrorism); HABECK,
supra note 11, at 19-39 (sketching the evolution ofjihad as a justification for violence). As Olivier
Roy points out, "the new jihad is an individual and personal decision" quite distinct from the
"collective duty (fard kifaya)" that jihad connoted in earlier doctrinal discussions. OLIVIER ROY,
GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 41-43 (2004); accord GILLES KEPEL,
JIHAD: EXPANSION ET DECLIN DE I'ISLAMISME 487-88 (2d ed. 2003).
195. See W. MONTGOMERY WATT, ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 159-60 (2008)
(chronicling the life, thought, and influence of Ibn-Taymiyya); see also WAEL B. HALLAQ, A
HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 139-40 (1997) (situating Ibn-Taymiyya in the context of
debates about the epistemological force of analogies); cf CHARLES ALLEN, GOD'S TERRORISTS:
THE WAHHABI CULT AND THE HIDDEN ROOTS OF MODERN JIHAD 42-48 (2006) (discussing IbnTaymiyya's life and how "his reinterpretation of jihad lies at the heart of modern Islamist
revivalism").
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instincts."l96 However it is generally used now, the term jihad clearly has a
rich history that lends itself to more than one interpretation.
The second reason to posit that error rates may be high is related to the
first: There is a long tradition in American constitutional law warning that
the state is especially likely to make mistakes when it interprets religious
texts. Whether or not this prediction was true when first made, it is plausible
to posit now that the tradition has discouraged government from investing in
expertise in religious speech. The prediction has become self-fulfilling.
Longstanding accounts of religious liberty in constitutional theory
underscore a special government fallibility in religious matters. In the
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, James Madison
warned that "the Civil Magistrate is [not] a competent Judge of Religious
Truth."l 97 He was echoing John Locke's 1689 first letter on tolerationl 98 as
well as an older Christian theological vein. 199 The assumption of state
incompetence in religious matters is widely echoed today by the courts and
analysts of the Religion Clauses. The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that "it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to
inquire whether [one person or another] more correctly perceived the
commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation."2 00 Commentators concur. Michael McConnell posits that
"government cannot be a competent judge of religious truth because there is
no reason to believe that religious understanding has been vouchsafed to the
majority, or any governmental elite."201 And Kent Greenawalt, in a recent
comprehensive treatment of the Religion Clauses, finds general agreement
about the "limited competence of secular courts" in matters of faith.202 There

196. ANNEMARIE SCHIMMEL, MYSTICAL DIMENSIONS OF ISLAM 98, 112 (1975).

197. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments ("Because
the Bill implies either that the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious Truth; or that he
may employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy. The first is an arrogant pretension falsified by
the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world."), reprinted in 5 THE
FOUNDERS CONSTITUTION 83 (Philip Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
198. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING
TOLERATION 220 (lan Shapiro ed., 2003).
199. See Douglas Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1667, 1672
(2003) (book review) (collecting Biblical authorities).
200. Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); see also
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) ("Men may believe what they cannot prove.
They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs.. .. If one could be sent to
jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would be left of
religious freedom.").
201. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem ofSingling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 24
(2000).
202. 1 GREENAWALT, supra note 124, at 262. Other commentators provide specific grounds for
concern about the status and treatment of religious identity. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 158, at 613
("[R]eligion remains as a distinctively dangerous political force, even as it serves for many
individuals as an important source of communal identity, personal understanding, and comfort.").
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is little dissent, in short, from the proposition that the state is not competent
in matters of religious meaning.
The Madisonian discounting of governmental knowledge of religion
rests on an ambitious and sophisticated epistemological account of religion.
Yet, there is no need to endorse that sophisticated account to conclude that
Madison may now be correct. Even if there is nothing special about religious
meaning, there has long been a broad consensus that the government is not
competent in the field of faith. Governments, at least in the United States,
have scant incentive to accrue such knowledge. Long-standing pessimism
about the state's competence in religious matters yields a self-confirming
result: underinvestment in religious knowledge. Quite apart from more ambitious Madisonian theories, this diachronic dynamic creates doubt about
government's ability to deal with religious terms accurately.
The third and final source of error lies in the institutional context in
which religious speech is used as a signal. Absent the development of a centralized stock of religious knowledge, decisions about how to interpret
religious speech lie in the hands of individual investigators and prosecutors.
Their incentives push them toward finding experts such as Khaleel
Mohammed, the expert witness who testified in Hayat's case, who will
confirm that costs sunk into investigations and prosecutions have been well
spent.203 To the extent that government now must rely on outside experts, it
risks compounding rather than mitigating error costs. Jurors, who are gener204
ally relied on to filter out false positives proffered by the government, are
unlikely to catch errors. Moreover, to the extent that government must
overcome a past failure to invest in religious competence, its current
incentives mean that any investments henceforth undertaken likely will be
tailored to maximize convictions rather than accuracy.
As a threshold matter, there is reason to be skeptical about the
decentralized manner in which decisions about religious speech's meaning
are made. The decision to hire an expert for a terrorism trial, for example, is
made on the retail level, not currently by a centralized mechanism. The resulting dispersion of authority creates opportunities for distortion. Pooling
discretion at the base of a bureaucratic chain always makes it difficult to determine whether animus or bias has influenced decision making. William
Stuntz has observed that "discriminatory policing is much harder to combat
when the police deal with individuals" because the retail is much more costly

203. See Waldman, supra note 7, at 89 (stating that the prosecution in Hayat's case felt that a
prayer found in Hayat's wallet was so critical to the case that the prosecution hired Mohammedwho affirmed that the prayer had no other use than in connection with violent jihad-to interpret it).
204. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) ("A fundamental premise of our
criminal trial system is that 'the jury is the lie detector."' (quoting United States v. Barnard, 490
F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973))); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891) (stating that
jurors "are presumed to be fitted for [their task] by their natural intelligence and their practical
knowledge of men and the ways of men").
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and intractable to monitor than the wholesale.205 While Stuntz was focused
on racial discrimination, the same holds for religious animus. Writing about
the distinct and different problem of discriminatory allocation of subsidies
for religious activities, Douglas Laycock argued that "discretion threatens
religious liberty" by enabling line drawing distorted by bias.206 In the context
of federal criminal prosecutions, for example, it is difficult to ensure that the
diverse Assistant U.S. Attorneys making decisions about who to call and use
as an expert will not exercise that discretion in ways that maximize the
chances of conviction rather than the accuracy of trial results. 207
Moreover, there are plausible reasons for being skeptical of the market
for expertise that prosecutors must tap in these cases. The provision of terrorism expertise is lucrative.20 8 It is reasonable to assume that it will attract
rent-seeking interest groups. Anecdotal evidence suggests state and local
police departments depend on "self-described experts whose extremist views
are considered inaccurate and harmful by the FBI."209 By definition, a
government ill equipped with the relevant knowledge cannot effectively
screen out rent-seeking "experts." Further, there is little empirical evidence
that government imposes demanding requirements in terms of formal
credentials. 2 10
Anecdotal evidence - from other countries with longer
experience with Muslim minorities supports this skepticism. 2 11 The federal
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in Germany, responsible
for domestic counterterrorism, for example, has also been criticized for its

205. William J. Stuntz, Local PolicingAfter the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2164 (2002).
206. Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Comment: Theology Scholarships,the
Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118
HARV. L. REV. 155, 195-96 (2004).
207. There is no reason to believe that the adversarial system will throw up the best available
expertise to enable a fact finder to resolve an empirical question. See Christopher Tarver
Robertson, Blind Expertise, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 184 (2010) (arguing that "[t]hrough selection,
affiliation, and compensation biases, litigants make experts more favorable but less accurate
compared to their base rates of accuracy in the real world").
208. See, e.g., JOHN MUELLER, OVERBLOWN: How POLITICIANS AND THE TERRORISM
INDUSTRY INFLATE THE NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS, AND WHY WE BELIEVE THEM 29-50

(2006) (describing the "terrorism industry" and condemning its distorting effect on policy choices);
Petra Bartosiewicz, Experts in Terror, NATION, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.thenation.com/article/
experts-terror (noting that one expert received $135,000 in Justice Department funds in one year).
209. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, Monitoring America, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2010,
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/monitoring-america/.
210. Bartosiewicz, supra note 208 (describing one expert who lacked formal academic
credentials and noting that those with credentials are often reluctant to take sides).
211. Elected officials generally evince low levels of understanding of Islam and Muslim
constituencies. See LoRENzo VIDINO, THE NEW MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD IN THE WEST 102-04
(2010) (discussing factors that contribute to "a pervasive ignorance among many of the top officials
in charge of issues that have closely to do with Islam and Islamism").
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incorrect translation of monitored religious groups' documents, which have
yielded accusations based on weak evidence.2 12
Countervailing incentives may mitigate these distortions. Government
officials clearly have a strong incentive to prevent terrorist attacks and a
strong fear of being blamed if they fail. But there is reason to doubt the latter
constraint's effectiveness. As a threshold matter, the costs and consequences
of policy failure are not evenly distributed so as to encourage efficient policy
responses. While the costs of developing a correct understanding of religious
speech in any particular case fall on one official alone, blame in the case of a
terrorist attack is dispersed widely. High-level, visible officials are more
likely than line officials to be publicly held to account. Perceptive
counterterrorism officials will have observed that few officials suffered due
to their failure to prevent the September 11 attacks. For example, the 9/11
Commission highlighted institutional problems, rather than isolating and
blaming particular individuals.2 13 Moreover, there is scant evidence that the
federal intelligence apparatus in fact can effectively respond to evolving
threats. To the contrary, a leading political science account suggests that intelligence agencies suffer from a sclerosis that has prevented them from
overcoming Cold War-era mindsets and investment strategies. 2 14 As recent
"near misses" suggest, American counterterrorism bureaucracies appear
215
simply to be quite bad at adapting to new circumstances.
In sum, the distinctive characteristics of religious speech and the
institutional environment in which it is used as a signal for counterterrorism
ends will predictably yield a high error rate. In turn, a high error rate means
that even if religious speech is otherwise reliable as a signal, the government
should be cautious before adopting it to that end.

212. INT'L CRISIS GRP.,

ISLAM

AND IDENTITY IN GERMANY

17

(2007), available at

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/l81 islam_ingermany.ashx.
213. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 26, at 73-107 (describing the evolution of
counterterrorist activities in the United States and noting institutional failures in law enforcement,
the FAA, the U.S. Intelligence Community, the State Department, the Department of Defense, the
White House, and Congress that impaired effective counterterrorist efforts).
214. See generally AMY B. ZEGART, SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF
9/11, at 49-56 (2007) (describing how government agencies do not experience the market pressure
to adapt that private firms experience). This was the case even before 9/11. See AMY B. ZEGART,
FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JSC, AND NSC 9 (1999) ("[T]he modem
We do not need a theory of
American national security apparatus has not performed up to par ....
optimal agency design to reach this conclusion.").
215. See, e.g., Ben Feller, Obama Acknowledges More 'Red Flags' in Flight Plot,
BOSTON.COM, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/01/06/
obama acknowledgesmoreredflags in flightplot/ (quoting President Obama as saying that the
Intelligence Community failed to "'connect [the] dots"' and prevent an attempted bombing by Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab).
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B. The Choice of OptimalSignalfor Domestic Counterterrorism
Even if law enforcement could overcome these hurdles, there is still the
question of whether religious speech is indeed the optimal signal for
counterterrorism ends. This subpart suggests that it is not. Mounting
empirical evidence points away from a correlation between religious speech
and terrorism, and instead highlights the importance of association-the
immediate, insular small groups to which a person is closely linked-in the
development of terrorist violence.
This argument proceeds in four sections. The first introduces basic
theories of signaling in conditions of asymmetric information from economic
theory. The second addresses the question whether religious speech provides
an effective signal. The third section looks at empirical and social science
evidence about what does correlate with political violence. The final section
considers constitutional objections to the use of association.
1. Signaling as a Solution to Information Asymmetries.-Governments
are searching for a readily observable trait that reliably correlates with terrorist risk in order to sort between those who may warrant targeting for
investigation or prosecution and those who do not. To understand solutions
to the problem, it is helpful to contrast the position of the government to the
position of an employer searching for productive employees-a situation that
has received much scrutiny in the economics literature.216 An employer
looking at a large pool of job applicants is searching for a candidate who will
not shirk or misbehave once hired. Like the government, the employer operates in a context of information asymmetry. Candidates know much more
about whether they will shirk or misbehave than the employer does. Like
government, employers seek low-cost signals that reliably sort out false
positives in order to hone in on the best candidates for a position. Both the
government searching for threats and the employer searching for employees
confront an unsegregated population and seek to sort for a certain "type"
within that population. Crucially, both are concerned that if they identify a
signal to discern the favored population, the disfavored population will
simply mimic that signal.2 17 Employers, that is, do not want to rely on some
indicia of job performance that less attractive candidates can easily imitate.

216. This is not the only instance in which government confronts a sorting problem.
Identifying desired migrants from a larger immigration inflow is another example of the problem.
See Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L.

REv. 809, 824 (2007) (describing immigration as an example of a sorting problem where the
information relevant to the sorting algorithm is unknown to the state but may be known to the
immigrants).
217. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics, 92 AM.

ECON. REv. 460, 463-64 (2002) (describing incentives to either share or hide information regarding
educational qualifications by individuals in the Kenyan employment market depending on how the
Kenyan government valued education).
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They must hence contend with two problems: first, the problem of accuracy
in the original signal and, second, the fact that even if a signal is accurate it
will be mimicked by the disfavored class to the extent that it can no longer
serve the sorting function.
In the employer's case, the sought-after population-i.e., productive
potential employees-has an interest in signaling to the employer who they
are. But the disfavored population-i.e., less productive employees-will try
to mimic that signal so as to persuade the employer that they should be hired
and thereby receive higher wages.218 The entity seeking to use a signal must
account for the strategic behavior of one portion of the population. Both
government and employers must pick a signal that minimizes inaccuracy and
also limits the strategic behavior of the disfavored class. In both cases, "the
fact that actions convey information leads people to alter their behavior" 219 SO
"even small information costs can have large consequences." 220
Economists studying the dynamics of employment markets have
developed a number of approaches and solutions to this distinctively
bifurcated selection problem. 2 2 1 In path-breaking work, Michael Spence
identified one solution. He argued that there may be a "signal [that] actually
does distinguish low- and high-productivity people and the reason it is able
to do so is that the cost of the signal is negatively correlatedwith the unseen
characteristic that is valuable to the employers."222 In the employment
market, education fulfills this function under certain conditions. Education is
an accurate proxy for the characteristics sought by an employer. Moreover,
the cost of obtaining education can be lower for productive candidates than
for unproductive candidates. Hence, it is cheaper for a more productive employee to obtain education and to signal her worth than it is for an
unproductive employee to mimic that signal. The inverse correlation
between productivity and the cost of the signal (education) undercuts the
ability of unproductive candidates to mimic the signal.22 3 By contrast, if
education's costs were identical for productive and nonproductive job
candidates in the market, the latter would mimic the educational investments
of their more productive peers. 2 2 4 Education in that case would no longer
play a useful signaling function.
218. See id ("[T]here are incentives on the part of individuals for information not to be
revealed, for secrecy, or, in modem parlance, for a lack of transparency.").
219. Id. at 473.
220. Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth

Century Economics, 115 Q.J. ECON. 1441, 1443 (2000).
221. See id. at 1450-53 (noting different approaches to the selection problem).
222. Spence, supra note 13, at 437 (emphasis added). Spence emphasized the possibility of
'multiple equilibriain the market." Id. That is, education does not always function as a signal; its
capacity to do so depends on its cost profile.
223. If education is too expensive for either high- or low-productivity workers, it will obviously
not serve the same function.
224. Id. at 440.
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The key to generalizing this model is the existence of two facts: (1) the
appearance of the signal is positively correlated to the desired trait, and
(2) the cost of the signal is negatively correlated with the underlying trait.22 5
It is, therefore, a necessary but not sufficient condition for an action to be
correlated with a specific trait for it to function as a signal. There must also
be a negative correlation between the favored trait and the cost of acquiring
the signal in order to preclude strategic mimicry.
2. Religious Speech's Limited Signaling Function.-It should be
immediately apparent from this model that religious speech cannot play an
effective signaling role. Religious speech fails to meet the second necessary
criteria for an effective signal: the cost of either using or avoiding stipulated
forms of religious speech is not correlated in any way with the characteristic
government seeks to identify. It is not meaningfully more expensive for a
terrorist to avoid telltale forms of religious speech than it is for a nonterrorist
to do the same. A terrorist group with even a modicum of strategic sense
would instead encourage its agents to eschew forms of religious behavior that
mark them out as possible suspects.2 26
The signaling function of religious-almost always Islamic in the
current context-speech in counterterrorism might alternatively be
predicated on the claim of a correlation between terrorist violence and
Islamic texts on the assumption that for Muslims these texts are costly to
avoid. Some commentators have indeed contended that there is a close connection between Islam as a faith and violence, quite apart from the
connection between certain texts and violence.227 On this logic, religious
speech works as a signal because it will be more costly for Muslims than for
non-Muslims to abandon such speech.
But there is in fact very little evidence that religiosity, even in general,
is correlated with the risk of terrorism. Compare the number of attempted
terrorist attacks by Muslim-Americans in the United States since 9/11 with

225. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 123 (1994) ("Employers

are most likely to be able to draw [positive] inferences when there is an action that industrious
applicants can take that is more attractive to them than to lazy applicants."); Nick Feltovich et al.,
Too Coolfor School? Signaling and Countersignaling,33 RAND J. ECON. 630, 631 (2002) (noting
that standard models conclude that "in a separating equilibrium, 'high' types ... send a costly signal
to differentiate themselves from lower types").
226. Al Qaeda indeed did in preparing the September 11 attacks. See JERROLD M. POST, THE
MIND OF THE TERRORIST: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM FROM THE IRA TO AL-QAEDA 200
(2007) (describing an al Qaeda training manual that instructs terrorists to avoid certain behaviors in
order to "maintain their cover").
227. See, e.g., SAM HARRIS, THE END OF FAITH: RELIGION, TERROR, AND THE FUTURE OF
REASON 123 (2004) ("Islam, more than any other religion human beings have devised, has all the
makings of a thoroughgoing cult of death."); Ralph Peters, Betraying Our Dead: Forgetting the
Vows We Made, N.Y. POST, Sept. I1, 2009, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/
opedcolumnists/betrayingourdeadH6T95rlBTCnkClUbEdUfsO (arguing that Islam is not a
religion of peace, as evidenced by "the curious absence of Baptist suicide bombers").
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the fact that, according to the Pew Research Center, there are at least 1.4
million Muslim adults age eighteen or older living in the United States.228
The sheer disparity (measurable in orders of magnitude) between the number
of American Muslims and the quanta of domestic terrorist violence makes a
necessary connection between faith and violence implausible. 22 9 Further,
studies of terrorism fail to find a correlation between terrorism and a particular belief structure such as Islam. As RAND Institute scholar Bruce
Hoffman has observed, any claim of a historical correlation between terrorism and religion (let alone a specific faith like Islam) is historically tenuous.
None of the eleven identifiable terrorist groups operating in 1968 was
religious, Hoffman notes, and it was not until 1980 that "the first 'modem'
religious terrorist groups appear[ed]." 2 30 Time-series studies of the geographic distribution of global terrorism also illustrate considerable variance
uncorrelated to patterns of religious settlement. 2 3 1 And a more discrete study
of Dutch Muslims found no causal relationship between religious orthodoxy
and political discontent. 23 2
Further evidence of the absence of correlation emerges from
Scholars who focus on
comparative analysis of religious terrorists.
religiously motivated terrorism instead emphasize the invariant incidence of
terrorist violence across faith groups. No faith has a monopoly on terrorist
violence.233 While religious belief can supply a "transcendent moralism with
which such acts are justified," the actual content of that belief proves less
important than the social structures and the community of interest that belief

228. PEw RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM
9-10 (2007), availableat http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf.
229. Across Muslim majority countries, support for terrorism also varies widely. C. Christine
Fair & Bryan Shepherd, Research Note, Who Supports Terrorism? Evidencefrom FourteenMuslim
Countries, 29 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 51, 53, 58 tbl.2 (2006).
230. BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 84-85 (rev. & expanded ed. 2006); see also
MATTHEW CARR, THE INFERNAL MACHINE: A HISTORY OF TERRORISM 239 (2006); ALAN B.
KRUEGER, WHAT MAKES A TERRORIST: ECONOMICS AND THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM 80-81 (2007)
("[R]eligious differences are among the many potential sources of the grievances that lead to
terrorism. They are not the only reason ... [and] are not specific to any one religion.").
23 1. See Gary LaFree et al., Cross-NationalPatternsof Terrorism: Comparing Trajectoriesfor
Total, Attributed and FatalAttacks, 1970-2006, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 622, 639 fig. 1 (2010)
(listing the countries with the highest total number of terrorist attacks between 1970 and 2006 as
Colombia, France, India, Israel, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Russia, Spain, Sri Lanka, and Turkey).
232. See MARIEKE SLOOTMAN & JEAN TILLIE, INST. FOR MIGRATION & ETHNIC STUDIES,
PROCESSES OF RADICALISATION: WHY SOME AMSTERDAM MUSLIMS BECOME RADICALS 4 (2006),
available at http://www.dmo.amsterdam.nl/publish/pages/85462/processesofradicalisationimes.pdf
(stressing that "orthodoxy does not lead automatically to political discontent (and from there to
potential radicalisation), and vice versa" because "the religious and political dimensions are
independent of each other").
233. See MARK JUERGENSMEYER, TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD: THE GLOBAL RISE OF
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE, at xi (3d ed. 2003) ("Violent ideas and images are not the monopoly of any
single religion. Virtually every major religious tradition . . . has served as a resource for violent
actors.").
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234

Hence, one study of religious terrorism has identified
binds together.
"remarkable regularity" in the "organizational design" of Muslim, Jewish,
and Christian groups that have resorted to violence: a thick network of interpersonal linkages that enables "mutual aid." 23 5 This anticipates a point
developed at greater length in the following section: What enables the commission of terrorist violence is a person's network of immediate associations,
not his or her particular beliefs. While religious belief can play an important
functional part of the process of endorsing the use of political violence, its
actual content is not terribly important in accomplishing that end.
This claim of correlation, however, might be amended to yield a
narrower hypothesis: that there is a correlation between certain strands of
Islam and political violence. Yet the relationship between the specific religious doctrine of sects in Islam and terrorist action appears fluid and
contingent. Case studies of more rigidly doctrinaire strands of Islam yield
surprisingly little evidence of connection between these traditions and political violence. Connections between violence and the revisionist puritanical
Saudi strain of Wahhabism, for example, are slim. 236 The Salafi movement
out of which al Qaeda emerges has factions that support and factions that oppose violent political action. 2 37 One Salafi group has even decreed "a general
ban on politico and jihadi publications." 2 3 8 The most comprehensive study of
a Western Salafist group currently available rejects the notion that "the
uniqueness of Islam" explains political violence and instead favors an
explanation focused on the "shared mechanisms of contention" particular to
the group at hand, not the contents of doctrine.239 Investigations of
developments among Salafist groups in Egypt also emphasize divisions
inside the movement, with prominent leaders of that movement explicitly
condemning the actions of al Qaeda, in particular the commission of terrorist
attacks.240 Sects that agree on a political role for Islam diverge about the

234. Id. at 10-11.
235. ELI BERMAN, RADICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND VIOLENT: THE NEW ECONOMICS OF TERRORISM
16 (2009).
236. See EL FADL, supra note 194, at 10-11 ("Wahhabism and its militant offshoots share both
But Wahhabism is distinctively inward-lookingattitudinal and ideological orientations....
although focused on power, it primarily asserts power over other Muslims.").
237. Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, 29 STUD. CONFLICT &
TERRORISM 207, 208, 225-28 (2006) [hereinafter Wiktorowicz, Anatomy]; Quintan Wiktorowicz, A
Genealogy of Radical Islam, 28 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 75, 75 (2005) [hereinafter
Wiktorowicz, Genealogy].
238. Wiktorowicz, Anatomy, supra note 237, at 221.
239. QUINTAN WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM INTHE WEST 14
(2005).
240. See FAWAz A. GERGES, JOURNEY OF THE JIHADIST: INSIDE MUSLIM MILITANCY 224-29
(2007) (describing the fractured Islamist reaction to 9/11); FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE FAR ENEMY:
WHY JIHAD WENT GLOBAL 29-34 (2005) (illustrating the struggle between jihadi leaders about
whether their efforts should be focused locally or globally); Peter Bergen & Paul Cruickshank, The
Unraveling: Al Qaeda's Revolt Against bin Laden, NEW REPUBLIC, June 11, 2008, at 16, 18
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legitimacy of violence in achieving an Islamic state, 241 and consensus on
Islamic doctrine consistently coexists with sharp disagreement about the use
of violence.242 The connection between religious ideology, even defined at a
relatively specific level within a particular faith tradition, and attitudes to political violence is therefore thin.
Finally, it is worth noting that studies have also rejected other frequently
suggested causes of terrorist violence. The political science, sociology, and
psychology literature, for example, uniformly rejects dispositional,
psychological accounts of terrorism, i.e., accounts grounded in terrorists'
individualized pathologies.24 3 Dean Louise Richardson pithily observes that
"terrorists, by and large, are not insane." 244 Efforts to build "a terrorist
profile" or to predict which individuals will engage in terrorism "have
Summarizing recent research, Richardson
invariably failed." 2 45
acknowledges that there are psychological traits common to those who use
terrorist violence: "Terrorists see the world in Manichean, black-and-white
terms; they identify with others [i.e., as part of a larger communal whole];
and they desire revenge."246 But it is not clear whether these attitudes are a
predisposition for the commission of terrorist violence or whether they are a

(describing the repudiation of al Qaeda by Sayyid Imam Al Sharif, the organization's "ideological
godfather"). Similarly, radical Islamists in Libya have also repudiated political violence. Id. at 17.
241. See Farhad Khosrokhavar, The Psychology of the Global Jihadists (identifying specific
sects that disagree on the use of violence), in THE FUNDAMENTALIST MINDSET 139, 139
(Charles B. Strozier et al. eds., 2010).
242. Wiktorowicz, Genealogy, supranote 237, at 75, 87.
243. There is a large body of literature on psychological profiling. See MICHAEL P. ARENA &
BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE TERRORIST IDENTITY: EXPLAINING THE TERRORIST THREAT 4 (2006)
(noting that research describing those who commit terrorist acts as "intrapsychically flawed,
abnormal, and/or psychopathic is rare and typically of poor quality"); id. at 26, 229 (finding
'serious limitations" in the focus on individual abnormality); JOHN HORGAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
TERRORISM 28-46 (2005) (discussing the limitation of psychology literature on terrorism but
stressing the importance of an "environmental context which gives rise to, sustains, directs, and
controls it"); MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS 83-91 (2004) (reviewing
and rejecting psychological personality explanations); Arie Kruglanski & Shira Fishman, The
Psychology of Terrorism: "Syndrome" versus "Tool" Perspectives, 18 TERRORISM & POL.
VIOLENCE 193, 195, 200-01 (2006) (noting that "the systematic quest for a unique terrorist
personality has yielded few encouraging results" and rejecting the idea of a "uniform sociopsychological phenomenon" of the terrorist "syndrome"); Max Taylor & John Horgan, A
Conceptual Frameworkfor Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist,
18 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 585, 585 (2006) (finding "little or no evidence of particular or
distinctive individual qualities being associated with the terrorist"); Charles Tilly, Terror as
Strategy and Relational Process, 46 INT'L J. COMP. SOC. 11, 21 (2005) ("If we are trying to explain
when, where, and how people actually engage in terror, relational explanations will serve us far
better than systemic or dispositional explanations.").
244. RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 14-15, 41. Psychologist Marc Sageman's study found
evidence of childhood conduct disorders in a small minority of the sample of Islamist terrorists he
studied (four of sixty-one). SAGEMAN, supranote 243, at 80-83.
245. RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 14-15, 41.
246. Id. at 41; see also id. at 41-44 (noting that these are reasons why individuals join a
terrorist group in the first place).
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consequence of having already become committed to terrorist action. Nor is
poverty, another frequent suspect, meaningfully correlated with terrorism. 247
In summary, not only religion but also other commonly assumed causes
of terrorism-such as psychological defects or poverty-all fail to show the
characteristics of a signal. They are not positively correlated to the incidence
of terrorism. Even if there were proof of a correlation, there is no evidence
that the cost of abandoning certain forms of religious speech would be negatively correlated with a likelihood of commitment to political violence.
Religious speech, therefore, is a poor fit for the signaling function in
counterterrorism.
3. Insular Groups and Terrorist Violence.-Another trait does,
however, correlate with the incidence of political violence and has the
appropriate cost profile to render it resilient to mimicry. There is growing
empirical evidence that the characteristics of a suspect's close and immediate
associations have these two characteristics: Association with individuals who
in turn are affiliated with terrorism, or are believed to present terrorist risks,
is correlated with the risk of terrorism. Further, because such association is
causally linked to the production of terrorism, it is more costly for those
wishing to engage in terrorism to give up those associations than for others.
The basic insight was captured in the U.K. Guardian newspaper in late
2006 by humorist Urmee Khan, who offered a list of ten "do's-and-don'ts"
for British Muslims. Number four was "Don't join groups or clubs":
Somewhere there is a dusty office in Whitehall whose function is
to ban organisations ....
The room is probably full of mildewed,
dusty files about Northern Ireland's paramilitary groups, and there is
no doubt a faded map of Belfast peeling from the wall. But now the
dust has been blown off, because there is a use for the office again.
If you are a barking mad, dangerous extremist, in a group prepared to
countenance violence to get their way, then you better make sure that
you are white. For Muslims, this is a no-no. So, to be a fully
accredited ordinary, decent Muslim, you should join only the Scouts,
the Brownies or-if force is your thing-the British Army. 248
The social science literature strongly suggests that Khan's wit hits close
to the mark. A consensus in that literature exists about one aspect of the
process of becoming a terrorist: its connection with insular groups. This consensus suggests that "[i]f we are trying to explain when, where, and how

247. See Edward Newman, Exploring the "Root Causes" of Terrorism, 29 STUD. CONFLICT &

TERRoRisM 749, 750-52 (2006) (finding no correlation between terrorist acts and either poverty or
educational deprivation).
248. Urmee Khan, How to Be an 'Ordinary, Decent' Muslim, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 31,

2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/aug/31/religion.uk.
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people actually engage in terror, relational explanations will serve us far
,,249
better than systemic or dispositional explanations.
In particular, a
person's immediate, intimate circle of association plays an important role in
becoming a terrorist: "[T]he process of radicalisation takes place in the
framework of a small group of friends." 250 Associational context correlates
better with the incidence of terrorist violence than religious speech. And, as
explored in greater detail below, association has the necessary cost profile to
limit mimicry: It appears to be difficult to become a terrorist without the appropriate cluster of associations.
The empirical and social science literature on political violence suggests
that terrorism is frequently seeded in small groups with distinctive idioms
and discourses.
"Arguably the most important development for
understanding the causes of terrorism are within group dynamics."25 1 Such
group dynamics and structures can be observed even within al Qaeda. 25 2
Within groups, shared and insular idioms, identities, and discourses prove
pivotal to terrorism's etiology. 2 53 The production of terrorism itself is
"undeniably a group process," in the sense that individuals almost invariably
accrue necessary incentives and skills to commit terrorist violence within

249. Tilly, supra note 243, at 21. In his larger work, Tilly emphasizes the collective context of
contentious political claim making in general. See CHARLES TILLY, THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE
VIOLENCE 31 (2003) ("[E]very actor that engages in claim making includes at least one cluster of
previously connected persons among whom have circulated widely accepted stories concerning
their strategic situation .... ).
250. Olivier Roy, Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative 16
(MICROCON, Policy Working Paper No. 2, 2008), available at http://www.microconflict.eu/
publications/PWP2_OR.pdf.
251. JASON FRANKS, RETHINKING THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM 41 (2006); see also ARENA &
ARRIGO, supranote 243, at 73-74 (stressing the centrality of "group relationships" because "groups
have a more immediate influence on shaping behavior" than traits such as race, religion, or
ethnicity); RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 45 (noting that becoming a terrorist "requires a
charismatic leader or a functioning organization to mix these feelings [of simplification,
identification, and revenge] .. . and turn them into action"); WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 1415 (describing the importance of social networks to recruitment for Islamist groups); HORGAN,
supra note 243, at 34, 104-07; Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 199-201; Taylor &
Horgan, supra note 243, at 590-91, 598 (all noting the importance of group context and
emphasizing "gradual socialization" into committing terrorist acts).
252. See ROY, supra note 194, at 50 ("Islamic radical movements are always structured as a
sect, with a tight-knit core and a looser network of sympathisers."); David J. Kilcullen, Countering
Global Insurgency, 28 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 597, 603 (2005) (describing al Qaeda as modeled "on a
traditional Middle Eastern patronage network" with an intricate "web of dependency" that is "like a
tribal group").
253. See TILLY, supra note 249, at 32 ("[C]onstituent units of claim-making actors often consist
not of living breathing individuals, but of groups, organizations, bundles of social relations, and
social sites such as occupations and neighborhoods."); Anthony Oberschall, Explaining Terrorism:
The Contribution of Collective Action Theory, 22 SOC. THEORY 26, 27-28 (2004) (noting the
importance of organizational capacity for achieving terrorist violence); Jerrold M. Post et al., The
Terrorists in Their Own Words: Interviews with 35 IncarceratedMiddle Eastern Terrorists, 15
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 171, 175 (2003) (observing the salience of group identity among the
terrorists studied).
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group contexts.254 These groups may be nested in a larger network structure
with independent dynamics. But it is the intimate, insular circle of friends
that warrants separate study for its incubational function in relation to
Absent this distinctive associational context, the literature
terrorism.
255
is potentially prohibitively costly to generate.
terrorism
suggests,
To understand the central importance of insular groups, consider
terrorism's gestation in purely functional terms (and, solely for the purpose
of analysis, stripped of moral implications). Recruitment to terrorism faces
at least two obstacles. 25 6 First, it confronts a collective-action problem.
Commission of terrorist violence means a small minority shoulders the cost
of political action on behalf of a larger group. Suicide terrorism, for
instance, may be collectively rational; individually, it is (generally)
considered not. Hence, a collective enterprise such as al Qaeda has quite different incentives when it comes to planning and committing terrorist acts
than its constituent members. As one study of suicide bombing has
observed, organizations "reap multiple benefits on various levels without
incurring significant costs" from attacks-a characterization that would be
inapposite applied to the individual attackers.257 In most cases, collectiveaction problems ought to render it unlikely that a discrete group will assume
risks of political action otherwise spread across a broader population. 2 5 8
How can a rational terrorist organization surmount this free-rider problem? 25 9

254. HORGAN, supra note 243, at 294.
255. But it not impossible: the claim here is probabilistic, not a matter of formal logic.
256. This is not to suggest that in every group there is a clearly identified facilitator. There are
some anecdotal accounts of groups moving collectively toward endorsement and use of terrorist
violence, rather than being moved in that direction by the conscious actions of one individual.
Some studies of terrorist recruitment among European Muslims, for example, highlight the role of
"gatekeepers[,] ... veteran militants who fought against the Soviets in the 1980s, or radicals who
have trained in jihadcamps." Petter Nesser, Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq:
Tracing MotivationalInfluences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe, 29
STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 323, 326 (2006); see also Donald Black, The Geometry of
Terrorism, 22 SOC. THEORY 14, 16 (2004) ("Pure terrorism is not only collective but well
organized."). But see Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 199-200 (observing a variety of
leadership, charismatic and otherwise, among terrorist groups).
257. MIA BLOOM, DYING TO KILL: THE ALLURE OF SUICIDE TERROR 76 (2005); cf id. at 84
(distinguishing between the individual and group rationality of suicide bombing). For an individual,
hypothesized posthumous spiritual rewards or the psychic gain of imagining an opponent's losses
might arguably suffice to make an act of suicide terrorism rational.
258. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 1-3, 7 (1971) ("[W]hen a number of individuals have a common or collective
interest-when they share a single purpose or objective-individual, unorganized action . .. will
either not be able to advance that common interest at all, or will not be able to advance that interest
adequately."); id at 33-36 (explaining why "the larger the group, the less it will further its common
interests").
259. See Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard et al., The Political Economy of Freedom, Democracy and
Transnational Terrorism, 128 PUB. CHOICE 289, 291 (2006) (discussing the "early application of
rational choice theory to the study of terrorism"); Michael Munger, Preference Modification vs.
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The second obstacle is ethical in nature. Terrorism requires the
commission of violence outside the accepted portfolio of political strategies
and entails acts that often transgress widely shared ethical boundaries.26 0
Ethical scruples generally stand in the way of terrorist violence, or at least
impose heavy costs on its commission, especially for those that a terrorist
organization seeks to recruit from a culture and educational environment that
otherwise rejects terrorism. Ethical scruples are often the focus of effective
counterterrorism strategy, which have often been focused on persuading potential and actual users of terrorist violence that the latter is morally wrong.26 1
The United Kingdom takes this approach now. One analyst characterized
British counterterrorism policy as bearing "far more resemblance to
countering an insurgency than to countering terrorism" because it is aimed at
"winning over the communities at the heart of the problem." 2 62
It is the distinctive characteristics of small groups that provide the
transformative environment for both preferences related to risk taking and
also ethical tastes. In Dean Richardson's evocative phrase, groups are
"complicit surround[s]."26 3 They are environments "in which violence is
condoned and even glorified" in ways that reorient individuals toward the
willingness to use asymmetrical violence against strangers.264 While it is of
course the case that not all small groups serve as incubators for violence, it is
also the case that terrorism's production is regularly linked to a small group
environment and that complicit surrounds play a causal role in becoming a
terrorist.
Consider first the collective-action barrier to terrorism. As sociologist
Michael Munger explains, one way of overcoming free-rider problems is by
altering tastes. Discussing terrorist recruitment, Munger identifies "culture"
as the "shared understanding of something that identifies insiders." 26 5 It is
these shared understandings and distinctive idioms and arguments that are
pivotal to terrorism's production. According to Munger, culture is the vehicle for changing "metapreference[s], in the sense [that] it tells us what we
should want to want." 266 For the terrorist recruiter, the complicit surround

Incentive Manipulation as Tools of Terrorist Recruitment: The Role of Culture, 128 PUB. CHOICE

131, 132, 138 (2006) (noting the risk of free riding).
260. See Charles Tilly, Terror, Terrorism, Terrorists,22 Soc. THEORY 5, 5 (2004) (describing

terrorism as the "asymmetrical deployment of threats and violence against enemies using means that
fall outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within some current regime").
261. See Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 202-03.
262. JOHN MACKINLAY, THE INSURGENT ARCHIPELAGO 199 (2009).

263. RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 49.

264. Id. Richardson uses the phrase to describe broader public cultures, but it also has
resonance here. Cf Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in the Explanation of Social Conflict,

144 U. PA. L. REV. 2079, 2105 (1996) ("Individuals tend to form their views on social issues within
the context of specific group memberships.").
265. Munger, supranote 259, at 153.
266. Id. at 144.
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supplied by a group constitutes the medium for transforming tastes. 26 7 And
culture, in the form of shared idioms, understandings, and arguments,
furnishes the lever for change.26 8 As Eric Hoffer, writing in 1951 in the
shadow of Nazism and Stalinism, summarized the process: "For men to
plunge headlong into an undertaking of vast change, they must be intensely
discontented yet not destitute, and they must have the feeling that by
possession of some potent doctrine, infallible leader, or some new technique,
they have access to a source of irresistible power."269
Terrorist groups have tools to overcome collective-action problems. 2 70
Reviewing recent research, Max Taylor and John Horgan argue that groups
provide cultural reorientation for terrorists. Groups are a "Community of
Practice," i.e., a "structure to understand the emergence of ideological and
social control" that can fashion new ideological and practical political
commitments.27 1 Within that framework, the group's culture influences
individual identity and "the meanings that persons attach to the multiple roles
they typically play."272 The group's tools are "shared symbols" whereby
"members partake of common encapsulations of their orientations." 273 That
common culture creates "interpretative schemata that provide a cognitive
structure for comprehending the surrounding environment" and,
significantly, "a language and cognitive tools for making sense of events and
267. The salience of culture as a source of tastes and preferences is not limited to terrorism.
Lauding networks of shared production, Yochai Benkler argues that such networks provide "shared
frames of meaning" through which individuals decide what "institutions and decisions are
considered 'legitimate' and worthy of compliance and participation," and "what courses of action
are attractive." YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 274-75 (2006). Contemporary terrorism involves a similar
pooling of ideas and social capital for quite different purposes. Another relevant analytic frame that
might be applied here is Pierre Bourdieu's notion of "habitus." See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF
A THEORY OF PRACTICE 78 (Richard Nice trans., 1972) (defining habitus as a "durably installed
generative principle of regulated improvisations" that produces regular behavioral patterns).
268. A religious "community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity
not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals." Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring).
269. ERIC HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS
11(1951).
270. In some contexts, this includes provision of nonspiritual services, in the form of material
aid to the families and intimates of group members. BERMAN, supra note 235, at 75-78 (describing
the use of mutual aid).
271. Taylor & Horgan, supra note 243, at 590-93.
272. Sheldon Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past,Present, and Future ofan Identity Theory, 63
SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 284, 284 (2000). Relevant here, Stryker and Burke describe how the "structure
and connectedness" of groups "provides the first level of social structures' impact on identities." Id
at 289.
273. Lawrence Rosen, The Integrity of Cultures, 34 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 594, 595 (1991).
As Alan Krueger notes, terrorists tend to be educated and thus to have developed a political
vocabulary. The utterly dispossessed, by contrast, lack the rhetorical arsenal necessary for the turn
to violence and thus rarely engage in terrorism. See KRUEGER, supra note 230, at 7, 46-48
(suggesting terrorists are more likely to come from moderate-income and high-income countries
than from low-income countries).
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experiences by interpreting causation, evaluating situations, and offering
prescriptive remedies."274 It is, in Clifford Geertz's famous summation,
"context" that makes acts and expressions "intelligibl[e]." 2 " Through group
identification, individuals revise their contextualized sense of individual
interests.276 Acts of violence previously seen as "maladaptive or even selfdestructive" are refashioned as rational.2 77
Some legal scholars have noted the salience of sociolinguistic dynamics
to the actions and internal dynamics of other violent or antisocial small
groups. Examining the dynamics of criminal conspiracies, Neal Katyal has
argued that small-group contexts facilitate transformations of individual
preferences and self-identifications as members "tend to refer more to each
other than they do to outsiders, listen more to each other, and reward each
other more often." 27 8 Katyal also notes that "people are far more likely to
experience doubts about their performance and disillusionment when they act
as individuals compared to when they act as groups." 279 The medium of such
transformations is the shared idiom and discursive practice of the group.280
Elaborating on the idea of group polarization, Cass Sunstein identifies its
mechanisms: informational cascades, whereby "small or even large groups of
people end up believing something-even if that something is false-simply

274. WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 15-16 (emphasis added).
275. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 14 (1973).
276. See AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 14 (2003) ("[R]ecognition of interests

often follows from group identification rather than being given simply by the pre-existing interests
of individuals apart from their group identifications."); Post et al., supra note 253, at 176
("[I]ndividual measures of success become increasingly linked to the organization and stature and
accomplishments within the organization.").
277. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715,
717 (2000). Relevant here, Akerlof and Kranton observe that identity also underlies "a new type of
externality." Id. They give the example of socialization into gender roles, and how a man wearing
a dress creates externalities in the form of other men's anxieties about masculinity. Id.
Analogously, an individual recruited to be a terrorist may experience new externalities as a result of
exposure to "impure" cultures. These in turn may reinforce his turn toward the group.
278. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1317 (2003).
279. Id at 1322.
280. Psychological research, explains Katyal, demonstrates that groups often polarize to
"extreme attitudes and behaviors," and alter members' perceptions of their own preferences. Id. at
1316-21. There are feedback loops between group identity and group rewards. See, e.g., id at
1362-63. Group polarization is "a predictable shift within a group discussing a case or problem.
As the shift occurs . .. groups coalesce, not toward the middle of antecedent dispositions, but
toward a more extreme position in the direction indicated by those dispositions." Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 85 (2000) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble]; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means,
Deliberation,and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 979-81, 985-86 (2005) [hereinafter

Sunstein, Group Judgments] (comparing the function of deliberation in problem solving and the
ability of individuals and groups to answer questions correctly).
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because other people seem to believe that it is true"; 28 1 the effect of a
"limited argument pool" that also "operate[s] in favor of group
polarization"; 28 2 and the tendency of a group's members to view themselves
in "self-contrast to others."283 Through a distinctive way of speaking, groups
reengineer individual preferences, often into closer alignment with group
interests. This deemphasis of individual interests, with a concomitant
elevation of group-based interests, is concretely how group culture surmounts collective-action problems. 284
"Culture" within an insular group is also relevant to the second obstacle
to recruitment to terrorism violence: the ethical tastes that would normally
preclude violence. Terrorist recruitment entails "not only instrumental but
also moral justification that would lend it legitimacy above and beyond its
instrumentality as a means.,,285 Ideologies inculcated by a terrorist group
"relate distant events to immediate behaviour," vesting specific acts and
circumstances with new meaning. 286 The "tight-knit" and "secret[ive]"
clusters287 that constitute terrorist groups furnish an environment for this
reorientation of ethical tastes.28 8 At the same time, groups satisfy a separate
taste, supplying a new sense of camaraderie and belonging. 28 9 Contemporary
studies of terrorists also find strong beliefs in the justice of terror as a

281. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note 280, at 82 (asserting that "[p]eople think and
do what they think ... relevant others think and do" thanks to informational cascades and
reputational sanctions).
282. Id. at 107.
283. Id. at 98.
284. See WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 18 ("For Islamist groups, socialization is thus
critical for mobilizing support and activism in the face of extensive costs and risks.").
285. Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 243, at 206.
286. Taylor & Horgan, supra note 243, at 58, 61.
287. ROY, supra note 194, at 50.
288. Michael Walzer has suggested that "moral life is rooted in a kind of association that
military discipline precludes or temporarily cuts off' because of the pressures of conformity, the
presumption of superior orders' validity, and the pervasive need to participate in unreflective
coordinated action. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 316 (1977). One way of seeing the moral valence of terrorist groups

is an effort to re-create, or even heighten, this aspect of military life.
289. Marc Sageman succinctly calls it the 'bunch of guys' phenomenon": "cliques commonly
produce social cohesion and a collective identity and foster solidarity, trust, community, political
inclusion ... and other valuable social outcomes." SAGEMAN, supra note 243, at 155-57; see also
RICHARDSON, supra note 189, at 48 (noting that many activists speak of an "intense feeling of
camaraderie within the group"); Chong, supra note 264, at 2110 ("People will sometimes defend
values that appear to run against their immediate self-interest in order to preserve social
relationships that return long-term benefits."); cf Mariano-Florentino Cudllar, The Untold Story of
al Qaeda's Administrative Law Dilemmas, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1302, 1339-40 (2007) (noting al

Qaeda's use of financial resources to secure loyalty). In his account of joining Hizb-ut-Tahrir, Ed
Husain notes that members gained greater social standing within the group for "more extrovert[ed]"
expressions of solidarity with the group. ED HUSAIN, THE ISLAMIST 67 (2007).
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political strategy.290
Such new solidarities, indeed, are collateral
norms" and "governance structures" that
of
the
"decentralized
consequences
29
flourish in complicit surrounds. ' This also happens in other social groups
that adopt violent tactics for expressive ends. In neo-Nazi groups, for
example, participants acquire a taste for violence on joining the group. One
female neo-Nazi explained, "It is remarkable how fast I shifted my
boundaries regarding violence. I used to be against violence, but now it does
not cost me a penny to beat up and take out my aggression on someone who
represents what I hate." 292 Quite literally, group membership changes the
293
personal cost of ethical transgression.
These models suggest that small groups could provide the environment
for generating terrorism. Empirical case studies of violent Islamic political
movements, especially in the recent European context, supplement the theoretical model by showing that complicit surrounds do provide a nurturing
environment for terrorism. These studies bear out the theoretical insights
about the role of group culture in overcoming collective-action problems and
dissolving ethical hurdles.
In the European context, sociologist Olivier Roy has found that most
"militants broke with their own past and experienced an individual reIslamisation in a small cell of uprooted fellows."294 The group responsible
for the July 2005 London attacks, for example, coalesced out of an "informal
social network" in mosques and bookstores, a network that provided
opportunities for the conspiracy's leader "to identify candidates for
indoctrination, even if the indoctrination itself took place more privately to
avoid detection."2 95
Individuals generally portrayed as lone actors also prove to be
embedded in intimate networks.296 The murderer of Dutch filmmaker Theo

290. See Kruglanski & Fishman, supra note 241, at 203 (rejecting the idea of a "uniform sociopsychological phenomenon" of the terrorist "syndrome"); Post et al., supra note 253, at 179
(describing how different terrorists justified their actions as a means to affect political change).
291. Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 373-76 (2003).
292. Karsten Hundeide, Becoming a Committed Insider, 9 CULTURE & PSYCHOL. 107, 111
(2003) (emphasis added).
293. One example of ethical reorientation is al-Muhajiroun's use of the doctrine of takfir, or
"the process of declaring a Muslim an unbeliever." WIKTOROWICZ, supra note 239, at 174. AlMuhajiroun has developed an intricately exhaustive enumeration of reasons for declaring
individuals takfiri, hence, moving them beyond the pale of ethical concern. Id. at 75.
294. ROY, supra note 194, at 52; see also id. at 316-19 (describing the formation of networks
in Europe and the United States); GILLES KEPEL, THE WAR FOR MUSLIM MINDS: ISLAM AND THE
WEST 250 (Pascale Ghazaleh trans., 2004); OLIVIER Roy, THE POLITICS OF CHAOS INTHE MIDDLE
EAST 144-45 (Ros Schwartz trans., 2008) (both noting the possibility of increasing cycles of
alienation among Muslim youth in Europe).
295. REPORT ON LONDON BOMBINGS, supra note 27, at 16-17; see also SLOOTMAN & TILLIE,
supra note 232, at 5 (describing radicalization as a "social phenomenon").
296. Bruce Hoffman points out that the "terrorist is also very different from the lunatic assassin,
who may use identical tactics," and distinguishes the "political" goals of a group from the
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van Gogh, Muhammad Bouyeri, for example, was no lone actor, despite the
solitary, idiosyncratic nature of his crime. He had drifted into the Hofstad
Group, "a jihadist group headed by a Syrian radical preacher," Abu
Khatib.297 Comprising sixteen militants, the Hofstad Group included a
spiritual leader and three people who had trained in Pakistan or
Afghanistan.298 What first appeared as the act of a crazed psychopath in fact
emerged from a thick local network of social relations and religious ideological commitments.
More relevant data comes from a study by the French sociologist Farhad
Khosrokhavar. He conducted detailed interviews with fifteen of the twenty
men imprisoned in France based on suspected or confirmed membership in
an al Qaeda affiliate, and he found few common social or economic traits.299
Instead, Khosrokhavar identified shared representations of the world and life
and shared idiosyncratic interpretation of symbols, events, and religious texts
as the common ground among his interviewees. 3 00 Through their complicit
surrounds, Khosrokhavar's respondents had developed idiosyncratic views of
the world and idioms that would have been hard to develop in more diverse
In another study of five terrorist
normative and ethical contexts.301
organizations, Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo also found that "symbols
developed shared meanings within individual groups and among their
respective memberships through exposure to history, culture, socialization,
and social structure." 302
Furthermore, studies of terrorists in the Middle East yield evidence that
distinctive discourses and idioms are critical to terrorist groups. In a study of
captured Middle Eastern terrorists, for example, Jerrold Post and his colleagues identified a characteristic "framework" and a "common bond of
"intrinsically idiosyncratic, completely egocentric and deeply personal" attitude of an individual
violent actor, even one such as Sirhan Sirhan (Robert Kennedy's assassin), who acted for explicitly
political ends. HOFFMAN, supra note 230, at 37. Hoffman argues that an individual acting alone is
not properly categorized as a "terrorist." Id.
297. Nesser, supra note 256, at 334; see also IAN BURUMA, MURDER IN AMSTERDAM: THE
DEATH OF THEO VAN GOGH AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE 193-95, 205-16 (2006) (recounting

Bouyeri's involvement in the Hofstad Group).
298. Nesser, supra note 256, at 334-35. Evidence suggested that the group had planned attacks
on Dutch public and governmental sites before being broken up by police. Id.
299. FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, QUAND AL-QAiDA PARLE: TEMOIGNAGES DERRItRE LES
BARREAUX 11, 20-21 (2006).

300. "Il faut ... tenter de comprendre les mdcanismes subjectifs qui leur donnent leur
spdcificit6, commandant leur representation du monde et leur v6cu, les sentiments religioux qui les
animent." Id. In one of Khosrokhavar's fascinating interviews, one informant sketches his view of
an unbridgeable gap between Islam and the West and specifically describes the separation as a
failure of interpretation: "Ily a une histoire commune entre l'Occident et I'islam mais en fait, rien
n'est commun. L'interpretationn'estpas commune." Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
301. Cf FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, INSIDE JIHADISM: UNDERSTANDING JIHADI MOVEMENTS
WORLDWIDE 9-10 (2009) (noting the evidence that shows that "Jihadist cells are formed in relation
to ties of family, friendship, local residence, and kinship relations").
302. ARENA & ARRIGO, supra note 243, at 230-31.
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belief' as regularities among the terrorists they profiled.3 03 They found a
consistent "readiness to merge . . . individual identity with that of the

organization in pursuit of their cause." 30 4 Once this "clear fusing of
individual identity and group identity" occurs, "the organization's success
become[s] central to individual identity and provides a 'reason for living."'305
Similarly, Bernard Rougier's study of jihadist networks in Lebanon's
Palestinian camps emphasizes "the way preachers played a decisive role in
refraining social reality exclusively
in religious categories," transforming
306
"perceptions of self and other."
Case studies of terrorist histories confirm that groups create and share
an internal "context ... within which [acts and expressions] can be
intelligibl[e]."3 07 It is the "shared symbols" 3 08 of particular group cultures
that give sense to doctrine and texts, from the throat note in the Hayat case to
the Koranic verses and hadith on jihad. Consequently, it cannot be assumed
that the meaning assigned by a broader religious culture to a particular text
will be shared by a subgroup. 30 9 The latter may take a more or less aggressive view of a text. In the prosecution of Hayat, by contrast, the state's
expert witness (and the jury) erroneously assumed that speech's local context
had no relevance and that meaning was fungible between different factions
and strands of a religious community. 310 The evidence about terrorism's
etiology suggests precisely the opposite: it is idiosyncratic and distinctive
local discursive contexts, not universally available religious meanings, that
enable the transformation of ethical tastes and preferences. Generalizing
inferences from the communal to the individual creates a special risk of error

303. Post et al., supra note 253, at 176.
304. Id. at 175.
305. Id.
306. BERNARD ROUGIER, EVERYDAY JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT ISLAM AMONG
PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 21 (Pascale Chazaleh trans., 2007).
307. GEERTZ, supra note 275, at 14.
308. Rosen, supra note 273, at 595; see also KHOSROKHAVAR, supra note 299, at 18
(emphasizing the coherence of "Jihadist ideology").
309. Winnifred Sullivan observes that the vast majority of religious practice in America is made
up of "folkways," not "high tradition." SULLIVAN, IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra
note 169, at 140-41, 146. In deciding which religious practices to recognize and protect, courts
must decide what "counts legally [as] religion." Id. at 147. Sullivan argues that courts have placed
themselves "at odds with the mainstream of American religion" by failing to focus on local
practices. Id.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 38-57.

890

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 89:833

when made without knowledge of an individual's local circumstances, 31 1 at
least in the absence of countervailing factors. 312
Empirical evidence, in sum, suggests that the production of terrorist
violence is correlated with the presence of an insular group that provides a
complicit surround for recruits and enables the reorientation of individuals'
ethical values and normative commitments. Studies from varied disciplinary
angles-from empirical sociology to history to rational-actor analysis-all
confirm the importance of such groups.
The causal connection between complicit surrounds and the production
of terrorist violence is relevant to the signaling problem in domestic
counterterrorism because association, understood in light of this empirical
research, shows the two necessary characteristics of an effective signal.3 13
First, existence of an appropriate complicit surround-not just any close or
intimate circle of associates, but a group where critiques of larger society and
justifications of violence are common verbal currency-is positively correlated to the desired trait. Second, it is more costly for the aspirant terrorist to
renounce this complicit surround than for others. There is a negative correlation between the cost of repudiating, renouncing, or avoiding such
complicit surrounds and the likelihood of becoming a terrorist because complicit surrounds furnish the ethical and organizational tools that enable
terrorism. The absence of a complicit surround is an effective signal of the
absence of terror risk for law enforcement. Further, it is a signal that is difficult for the aspiring terrorist to mimic. Of course, it is possible to engage in
terrorism without the benefit of a complicit surround. The relation is a
probabilistic correlation, not a logical entailment. The rising level of concern
about domestic terrorism and sleeper cells, however, renders it plausible that
in many situations law enforcement will find some value in the use of associational context as a signal to sort for possible terrorism risk.
4. ConstitutionalObjections.-Before turning to the institutional-design
questions implicated by any effort to incorporate these findings about
association as a potential signaling tool in counterterrorism, it is worth asking
whether there are constitutional objections that preclude such reliance. To
the civil libertarian, the reorientation of domestic counterterrorism proposed
311. Anthropologists have long been acutely aware of "the difficulty of grasping the world of
alien peoples-the many years of learning and unlearning needed, the problems of acquiring a
thorough linguistic competence" and, perhaps more relevant here, the "both subtle and blatant"
ways understanding is "directed or circumscribed by ... informants." James Clifford, On
Ethnographic Authority, REPRESENTATIONS, Spring 1983, at 118, 122, 135.
312. There may be other factors cutting in favor of wider judgments. For example, al Qaeda
and its affiliates have invested in "ideological training." ROHAN GUNARATNA, INSIDE AL-QAEDA:

GLOBAL NETWORK OF TERROR 112-26 (3d ed. 2003). They have "intuitively grasped the
enormous communicative potential of the Internet" in spreading their ideology. HOFFMAN, supra
note 230, at 214-20.
313. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
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here may seem unappealing: It appears to trade government pressure on religious liberty for the sacrifice of associational freedoms that are protected by
another part of the First Amendment. But again, constitutional doctrine imposes very little constraint on the path proposed here. Gains to constitutional
rights are to be had not from a strict delineation of protected interests but rather by increasing the efficacy of law enforcement interventions, eliminating
tactics that generate errors, and minimizing overall the volume of false
positives.
Like the Religion Clause doctrine examined in Part II, doctrine under
the Free Speech Clause is ill designed to address the constitutional externalities of new law enforcement tactics prompted by terrorism concerns. Free
speech doctrine received its definitive elaboration long after the
Amendment's adoption, with the 1950s and 1960s being pivotal moments in
the Court's elaboration of doctrinal protection for dissenting political speech.
At the time, judges were immediately motivated by concerns about the overreach of anti-Communist efforts in Congress and across the states.314
Postbellum anti-Communism illustrated the perils of guilt by association.
"[T]housands of Americans were targeted, investigated, blacklisted,
harassed, and driven from public employment or office on charges that they
were members of or fellow travelers with the Communist Party." 315 As a
result, the Court crafted doctrine with special sensitivity to the risks of guilt
by association. Now-canonical precedent directs that associational conduct
can be punished only when evidence exists that a defendant has a "specific
intent" regarding an organization's criminal ends. 1 This specific intent rule
prevents jurors from using unpopular associational ties as a proxy for
dangerousness. It hence mitigates "the special danger that juries trying
defendants who have advocated unpopular social doctrines will find serious
intent on the basis of ambiguous evidence." 317 That is, it responds to and attempts to mitigate the specific danger to First Amendment values that
happened to be the most salient at the time of the doctrine's articulation in
the Cold War era.
This specific intent rule, however, does not preclude the turn to
association to root out terrorist risk for at least three reasons. First, that rule
does not preclude the use of association at the investigative stage. In
314. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789-2008, at

232-39 (2009) (describing the Cold War historical context).
315. David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of

Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REv. 203, 216.
316. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966); see also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258, 262 (1967) (noting the specific intent requirement of the Smith Act); Scales v. United States,
367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961) (finding the specific intent requirement to be "fairly implied" from the
statute); cf Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (finding a statute that indiscriminately
classified innocent activity with knowing activity to be an unconstitutional assertion of arbitrary
power).
317. GREENAWALT, supra note 107, at 266.
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investigations, iterative interactions with other suspects furnish grounds not
merely for law enforcement attention but also for individual searches. It is
only when police rely on "mere propinquity" to a crime that search becomes
unlawful.31 8 Nor do suspects have any constitutional protection against
informants,3 19 the most frequently used policing tool for piercing complicit
surrounds. At the investigative stage, therefore, concerns about "guilt by
association" do little constraining work.
Second, at the trial stage there is no bar to the introduction of evidence
concerning association as one means of showing specific intent. In announcing the specific intent rule, the Supreme Court pointed to expressive
evidence and directed that while that material was "not in itself sufficient to
show illegal advocacy," it nonetheless was admissible and had potential
inculpatory "value in showing illegal advocacy." 320 That dynamic was
visible in prosecutions under the Smith Act. 3 2 1 Smith Act prosecutions
involved "routine introduction" by the prosecution of "massive collections of
books, tracts, pamphlets, newspapers, and manifestoes discussing
Communism, Socialism, Capitalism, Feudalism and governmental
institutions in general ... . Guilt or innocence . .. turn[ed] on what Marx or
Engels or someone else wrote or advocated as much as a hundred or more
years ago." 32 2 Blocked from using associations against a defendant, the federal government nevertheless could use her words against her. If specific
intent can be demonstrated by evidence of expressive conduct, it is difficult
to see why evidence of association should not also be probative.
Third, the Supreme Court has recently loosened the First Amendment's
constraint on criminal penalties for associational conduct. Upholding
speech-related applications of one prong of the material support law, the
Court held that speech coordinated with a proscribed terrorist organization
could be criminalized.323 The Court's decision in Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project unconvincingly distinguished between constitutional protection
of membership and constitutional indifference to material support in the form
of speech, implying that it was a constitutionally protected activity to join an
organization but a potentially criminal one to engage in any speech that aided

318. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); cf Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372
(2003) (upholding searches of all men in an automobile where narcotics were found).
319. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300-03 (1966) (rejecting Fourth Amendment
arguments against the use of informants).
320. Scales, 367 U.S. at 232-33.
321. See Alien Registration (Smith) Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (2006)) (criminalizing advocacy of the forceful overthrow of government).
322. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 339 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The record in Yates consisted of 14,000 pages. Id. at 327 n.34 (majority
opinion). Yates's prosecution for advocacy of "Marxist-Leninist principles" was "standard fare" in
Smith Act cases. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH INWARTIME 413 (2004).
323. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2724-27 (2010).
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the organization.324 In so doing, the Court applied a standard of review that,
while notionally robust, in practice resembled rational basis scrutiny of the
proffered governmental justifications. 32 5 The net result was to reduce
constitutional protection against guilt by association in a class of cases
defined by the government to a token ban on membership proscription that
government can easily circumvent. As in other areas of the law, the Court's
post-9/1 1 amendments to constitutional doctrine are less adaptation and more
abrogation.
Current constitutional doctrine, in short, has no more of a constraining
role with respect to government use of association as a signal than it does
with respect to religious speech. Constitutional law is path dependent. 32 6 it
is shaped by the problems that were salient when doctrine was fashioned.
Change is difficult and costly. And in the face of rising concerns about
terrorism, change in ways favorable to suspects and defendants is especially
unlikely.327
5. Conclusion.-After 9/11, reliance on the signaling function of
religious speech in domestic counterterrorism may have seemed plausible
and even necessary in light of al Qaeda's open appeal to religious justifications and solidarities. But increasing evidence from empirical and social
science studies of terrorism casts doubt on that approach. There is scant reason to believe that religious doctrine or speech correlates with political
violence. Rather, the social science and empirical evidence suggests that one
of the regularities of terrorism's production is the presence of closely knit
complicit surrounds in which individual tastes and preferences concerning
violence and political change are reengineered. Evidence of a person's
immediate associations appears correlated with terrorism's incidence. It is
also costly for aspirant terrorists to mimic nonterrorists by eschewing such

324. See id at 2730 ('"The statute does not prohibit being a member of one of the designated
groups or vigorously promoting and supporting the political goals of the group.... What [§ 2339B]
prohibits is the act of giving material support . . ..' (quoting Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,
205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000))). The protection of membership simpliciter, but not
membership plus any affirmative collaboration, in effect renders collective action impossible.
325. See id. at 2724-31 (affirming that the case was controlled by precedents dictating a high
level of scrutiny but nonetheless liberally hypothesizing as to how plaintiffs' speech could aid
proscribed terrorist organizations).
326. For a general explanation of path dependency, see Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path
Dependence, and the Study ofPolitics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 260-62 (2000). For applications
in law, see Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal

Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 603-06 (2001); John 0. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 543, 570 (2005); R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness,

91 MARQ. L. REV. 687, 694 (2008).
327. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune Telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of Terrorism,
Slippery Slopes, and Predicting the Future, 58 RUTGERS L. REv. 195, 234-35 (2005) (explaining

how fresh acts of terrorism increase pressure to relax civil liberties).
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associations. Extending Spence's model of signaling on job markets, it is
therefore plausible to posit that one way in which law enforcement can sort
for possible terrorist risk is by searching for complicit surrounds of the appropriate kind.
C. Retooling SignalingPolicy
For terrorist conspiracies generated domestically-which is the category
that law enforcement is increasingly concerned about-an insular associational environment serving as the complicit surround appears to be almost
always-or at least with great empirical regularity-pivotal to the production
of terrorism. It is more costly for aspirant terrorists than for members of the
general population to give up their complicit surrounds. But how then can
law enforcement use association as a differentially "costly signal" 32 8 to sort
possible aspirant terrorists from the general population? This subpart identifies three strands of current counterterrorism practice in the United States and
the United Kingdom that build on association as a signal for counterterrorism
ends. Its aim is not to endorse any of these measures, or to evaluate comprehensively costs and benefits, but rather to point to possibilities.
First, in the United States, police have invested heavily in invasive and
noncooperative tactics such as surveillance, electronic monitoring, and
informants. The New York Police Department (NYPD), for example,
aggressively deploys informants within New York's Muslim community to
monitor conversations there. In 2006, testimony in the federal criminal
prosecution of 23-year-old Shahawar Matin Siraj, who was charged with
plotting an explosion at the Herald Square subway station, revealed that at
least three informants working for the NYPD's Terrorist Interdiction Unit
had been attending services regularly at a Brooklyn mosque, the Islamic
Society of Bay Ridge, in winter 2003.329 In May 2009, another set of arrests
in an alleged terrorist conspiracy again hinged on the testimony of an

328. Feltovich et al., supranote 225, at 631.
329. See William K. Rashbaum, At Trial on Subway Bomb Plot, Informer Finishes Star Turn,

N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at B2 (illustrating the mosque police informant's colorful testimony);
William K. Rashbaum, Closing Arguments in Trial ofSubway Bombing Case,N.Y. TIMES, May 23,

2006, at B3 (elaborating on the entrapment defense of a subway plotter caught with help from the
mosque informant); William K. Rashbaum, Window Opens on City Tactics Among Muslims:
Getting a Conviction and Causing Concern, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2006, at B29 (recounting

courtroom revelations of the police informants' activity at an area mosque). For similar stories, see
John Caher, Terrorism Trial oflMuslims Raises Issues ofEntrapment, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 2006, at 1
(reporting on the trial of businessmen accused of entering into a money laundering plot with an
undercover agent posing as a terrorist); Larry Keller, Disputes Bedevil Terrorism Arrests: Opinions
Diverge on Whether IncreasedPost-Sept. II Arrests Are Justified or Effective in Fighting the War

on Terror, PALM BEACH POST, June 26, 2005, at Al (highlighting the dilemma posed in
distinguishing "wannabees egged on by [an] undercover agent to make foolish boasts" and serious
terrorists); Walter Pincus, FBI Role in Terror Probe Questioned: Lawyers Point to Fine Line

Between Sting and Entrapment, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2006, at Al (detailing the role of FBI
informants in a nascent terrorist cell and the possibility of entrapment).
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informant who cultivated contacts through a Newburgh, New York,
mosque.330
This strategy risks considerable harms. Aggressive use of informants,
especially within religious communities, not only imposes burdens on third
parties' constitutional rights but also risks false positives. 33 1 In the Siraj
case, for example, evidence at trial cast doubt on whether Siraj would ever
have acted absent the informant's encouragement. A federal informant in
Orange County, California, "aggressively promot[ed] terrorism plots and
tr[ied] to recruit others to join him." 332 Creating complicit surrounds by the
deployment of agent provocateurs may also risk the inefficient deployment
of policing resources even aside from constitutional costs.
An alternative to hostile acquisition of information is the cultivation of
information-sharing networks with religious and ethnic minorities through
collaborative means. In the United Kingdom, police have taken this tack.
Leading this approach is a new unit within the Special Branch of London's
Metropolitan Police called the Muslim Contact Unit. This unit cultivates relations with the London Salafist and Islamist communities with the aim of
identifying potential recruits to violence early. It was formed after a member
of one of these mosques approached local police to urge them to investigate a
man called Richard Reid, later the so-called shoe bomber, who had expressed
an interest in violence.333 The British strategy leverages the insight that
transparency will be cheaper for groups that do not intend to cultivate
political violence.334 By affirmatively offering the benefits of a closer
relationship with police-for example, by serving as a liaison between
cooperating groups and other parts of the police and government-the
Muslim Contact Unit obtains much of the local knowledge gleaned via
informants without the false positives or damage to constitutional rights and
police-community relations.335 The American reliance on informants, by
contrast, may well prove less effective in the long term than the British
approach as trust in the police declines (leading to fewer leads through

330. William K. Rashbaum & Kareem Fahim, Informer's Role in Bombing Plot: Looking for
Recruits in a Newburgh Mosque, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2009, at Al.

331. For a general analysis of the legal regulation of confidential informants, see Alexandra
Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645

(2004).
332. Teresa Watanabe & Scott Glover, Man Says He Was FBI Informant, L.A. TIMES, May 23,
2009, at Bl.
333. Robert Lambert, Empowering Salafis and Islamists Against Al-Qaeda: A London
CounterterrorismCase Study, 41 PS: POL. SC. & POL. 31, 32 (2008).

334. To be sure, information privacy is valuable to many people without respect to their links to
crime or terror.
335. Lambert, supra note 333, at 32.
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cooperation) and potential terrorists find ways to work around the problem of

informants. 3 36
Second, governments have tried to build a more textured understanding
of social contexts in order to more accurately identify complicit surrounds.
Some governments stumbling toward this goal have turned to data-collection
efforts so broad-brush and indiscriminate that they raise concerns about racial and religious profiling. In Germany, for example, the BfV monitors the
publications, statements, meetings, and mosques of both federally registered
and "homegrown," or underground, civil-society groups even if these organizations are entirely law-abiding.3
In the United States, similar efforts
proved controversial. In October 2007, for example, the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) announced a decision to implement a "community
mapping" plan in order to "lay out the geographic locations of the many
different Muslim population groups around Los Angeles . .. [and] take a
deeper look at their history, demographics, language, culture, ethnic
breakdown, socio-economic status, and social interactions" so as to "identify
communities, within the larger Muslim community, which may be
susceptible to violent ideologically-based extremism., 33 8 The breadth of the
plan, and its presentation as a fait accompli, elicited vigorous opposition
from Los Angeles's Muslim-American community. In response, Mayor
Antonio Villaraigosa scrapped the plan, citing the "fear and apprehension"
prompted by its disclosure.3 39
But community mapping may have been a lost opportunity for both
police and the Muslim-American community in Los Angeles. Rather than an
invasive, onerous, and racially disparate scheme of surveillance, the project
could have been a collaborative measure aimed at diminishing the need for
more intrusive measures, such as the insertion of informants into religious
communities.340 It could have been the ground for closer relationships

336. See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe & Paloma Esquivel, Muslims Say FBI Spying is Causing
Anxiety: Use ofan Informant in Orange County Leads Some to Shun Mosques, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1,

2009, at BI (describing community outrage and degradation of the FBI's reputation with the
community as effects of the FBI's use of undercover informants in local mosques).
337. INT'L CRISIS GRP., supra note 212, at 14-15.
338. The Role of Local Law Enforcement in Countering Violent Islamist Extremism: Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov. Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Michael P.

Downing, Commanding Officer, Counter-Terrorism/Criminal Intelligence Bureau, LAPD),
available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/index.cfmFuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing
ID=483590e6-9f4e-4aa6-b595-8ca3791e4acb.
339. Richard Winton & Teresa Watanabe, LAPD's Muslim Mapping Plan Killed, L.A. TIMES,

Nov. 15, 2007, at Al; see also Richard Winton et al., Outcry over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 10, 2007, at Al (noting "intense backlash" against the mapping plan and concerns among
Muslim activists and civil libertarians that it amounted to "religious profiling").
340. Similar frictions arose in the United Kingdom around the government's "Prevent"
strategy, which included local government agencies in counterterrorism strategies. Some Muslim
community groups objected to "the requirement in the [Prevent] strategy for local authorities to
have a 'sophisticated understanding of local Muslim communities."' HOUSE OF COMMONS
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between mosques and police that would not just facilitate more focused
investigations but that would enable community leaders to secure policing
against hate crimes. 341 Rather than confrontation, it could have been a platform of cooperation to alleviate tensions over profiling or intrusive
policing. 34 2 Alas, the opportunity was squandered on both sides.
Third, governments now use information about associations to condition
benefits or privileges in ways that raise the costs of membership in a complicit surround and so sort for aspirant terrorists. Consider an example from the
United Kingdom:
Mr. Tariq commenced employment with the Home Office in April
2003 as an immigration officer. He received the necessary security
clearance. However, in August 2006, he was suspended from duty
due to national security concerns and on 20 December 2006 all levels
of security clearance were withdrawn from him. He was told that this
was based on his close association with individuals suspected of
planning to mount terrorist attacks and that it was considered that
association with such individuals might put him at risk of their
attempting to exert influence on him to abuse his position as an
immigration officer. 343
The fact of association with a potential complicit surround was here the
basis for denial of an employment-related benefit. The same approach, it is
worth noting, is feasible under U.S. law because of the absence of judicial
review of such employment decisions.344 More generally, this tactic raises
the possibility that association can be used to condition benefits in ways that
sort for potential terrorism risk.
Again, this approach raises risks of inequitable error and collateral
harm. At a minimum, in cases like Mr. Tariq's, it would seem generally

COMMUNITIES & LOCAL Gov'T COMM., PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: SIXTH REPORT OF

SESSION 2009-10, at 15 (2010), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/
cmcomloc/65/65.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT]. Non-Muslim ethnic groups also
objected to the greater local government attention toward Muslims. Id. at 18.
341. See Tom R. Tyler, Stephen J. Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence
Effects in Counterterrorism: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 L. & Soc. REV. 365 (2010)
(presenting empirical evidence that public cooperation in counterterrorism efforts is linked to public
perceptions of police procedural justice).
342. Cf KEPEL, supra note 294, at 8 ("The most important battle in the war for Muslim minds
during the next decade will be fought not in Palestine or Iraq but in these communities of believers
on the outskirts of London, Paris, and other European cities, where Islam is already a growing part
of the West.").
343. Home Office v. Tariq, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 462, [2] (Eng.).
344. Federal courts have declined to review the merits of decisions to deny security clearances.
See Bennett v. Chertoff, 425 F.3d 999, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("Because the authority to issue a
security clearance is a discretionary function of the Executive Branch and involves the complex area
of foreign relations and national security, employment actions based on denial of security clearance
are not subject to judicial review, including under Title VII."); Ryan v. Reno, 168 F.3d 520, 523
(D.C. Cir. 1999) (collecting like authority from other circuits).
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feasible for the state to mitigate those costs by reassigning the barred
individual to an equivalent, nonsensitive position and by taking steps to
dissipate any downstream reputational consequences of the transfer.
Alternatively, government might use subsidies to sort among private groups
and to encourage groups to be transparent so as to preclude their functioning
as a complicit surround. Groups that aim at violence will find transparency
more costly than groups that are innocent. Insularity is more valuable to the
former. Of course, this is not to say that transparency has no cost for nonterrorist groups. Privacy and resistance to state surveillance are valued by many
private groups. Private groups allow ideas and norms to develop free of potentially distorting state influences by providing "a vital margin of political
safety from control by outside elites." 3 45 Social spaces free of state
supervision "enable[] people to engage in worthwhile activities in ways that
they would otherwise find difficult or impossible."34 6 Rather, the point is
that transparency will be more costly for a group connected to terrorism than
for one concerned with privacy alone. A group aimed at political violence
has an additional and especially powerful reason for valuing the freedom
from state supervision. By finding ways to enable suspected groups to signal
the absence of terrorism risk through transparency, the state may be able to
better isolate possible threats from some larger pool of suspects.
Although current constitutional doctrine forbids the state from
conditioning subsidies on the forfeiture of constitutional rights,347
government can channel funds to religious or ethnic groups that affirmatively
engage in collaborative partnerships with law enforcement. In the United
Kingdom, the British government has channeled funding to some domestic
imams through a program called "the Radical Middle Way," which is aimed
at promoting nonrejectionist strands of Islam.348 In October 2006, the British
government announced £5 million scheme to be disbursed through local governments to train imams, establish study circles for young people, and engage
with at-risk youth.349 Several of these interventions explicitly aimed to
345. JAMES C. ScoTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 54 (1998).
346. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484 (2006); see also
Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: InformationalPrivacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1373, 1427-28 (2000) ("Informational privacy ... is a constitutive element of a civil society in the
broadest sense of that term.").
347. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 59 (2006) (stating that
the government cannot withhold benefits from a person due the constitutionally protected exercise
of free speech, even if the person is not entitled to the benefit).
348. Birt, supra note 91, at 701-02.
349. See HOUSE OF COMMONS, COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOv'T COMM., PREVENTING
VIOLENT EXTREMISM PATHFINDER FUND 2007/08: CASE STUDIES 4 (2007) (discussing the
objectives of the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund, including establishing dialogues
with communities and working with mosques and educational institutions, and deciding to increase
the funding available to six million pounds for fiscal year 2007-2008); see also HOUSE OF
COMMONS, COMMUNITIES & LOCAL GOV'T COMM., PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM:
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strengthen "mainstream Islamic voices" at the expense of more marginal
groups.350 In the United States, similar efforts occur in the foreign-aid realm.
The U.S. Agency for International Development has programs in Indonesia
that "promote[] a moderate or liberal form of Islam over more extreme sects"
via conditional federal funding.35 ' Such efforts have been controversial.
of
Critics in the United Kingdom have argued that they have the effect
o ud
11352
The flow of fund
"singling out" Muslims from other ethnic communities.
ing may also "reinforc[e] the Muslim identity because it only approaches
Muslims through their faith rather than recognizing that everyone, all
communities, all people, has lots of different identities and multiple
identities."353 Such criticisms may be blunted by careful policy design. They
may also lose their force if the alternative is more coercive forms of law
enforcement.
This method of distinguishing dangerous groups has a historical
precedent of sorts. In the aftermath of the English Civil War, the English
1689 Toleration Act relieved Protestant dissenters of the statutory penalties
that had previously been imposed on them out of fear of their political
disloyalty-but at a price: "[D]issenters had to certify the place of their
congregation to local authorities, . . . they had to leave the doors of their

chapels unlocked during meetings, and ... they had to take oaths of
fidelity." 354 The price of avoiding generalized suspicion of sedition, in short,
was increased transparency-literally opening their doors to the state. In the
short term, this imposed a heavy cost on a minority of religious dissenting
groups. In the long term, however, historians argue that it eased the path of
religious toleration in Britain as "the monopoly of the established Church
gave way to consumers' choice in religion." 355 Short-term costs, therefore,
may be balanced by the long-term gain in the mitigation of friction and
animus directed at minority groups.

COMMUNITY

LEADERSHIP FUND

GUIDANCE 3 (2008)

(describing availability of funds

for

community groups); Alan Travis, New Plan to Tackle Violent Extremism, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
June 3, 2008 (describing the plan as a "nationwide 'deradicalisation' programme").
350. HM GOVERNMENT, THE PREVENT STRATEGY: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL PARTNERS IN
ENGLAND 18 (2008).
351. Jessica Powley Hayden, Note, Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and U.S.
ForeignAid, 95 GEO. L.J. 171, 179 (2006).
352. HOUSE OF COMMONS REPORT, supra note 340, at 21 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
353. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Vikram Dodd, Communities Fear
Project to Counter Extremism Is Not What It Seems, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 19, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/16/prevent-counter-islamic-extremism-intelligence
(noting concerns about information sharing as a consequence of the Prevent strategy).
354. Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 840 (2004) (citing the Toleration
Act, 1689, 1 W. & M., c.18 (Eng.)).
355. CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE CENTURY OF REVOLUTION, 1603-1714, at 211-12 (1961).
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Conclusion

One of the most difficult challenges in contemporary counterterrorism
policy is identifying signals or proxies for the risk of terrorism in an
information-poor context. By drift or default, law enforcement has turned to
religious speech to serve as that signal in American and British domestic
counterterrorism. In the American context, the First Amendment, which
might be thought to preclude such reliance, in fact places few constraints on
this approach. As has been generally the case, constitutional doctrine has not
adapted or responded to the way in which post-9/11 counterterrorism policies
may impose new costs on constitutional rights. Although constitutional doctrine yields no impetus for the state to change tack, the emerging social
science evidence about terrorism suggests a reason for rebooting. That
literature shows there is scant evidence of a correlation between religious
speech or particular religious ideologies and terrorism. By contrast, one observed regularity in the incidence of terrorism is the salience of complicit
surrounds in the development of terrorism. Governments should focus on
association, rather than religious speech. Law enforcement policies are already edging tentatively toward this goal, albeit in occasionally problematic
ways. This Article has aimed to encourage further experimentation and investment to that end as part of a larger ongoing reconsideration of the first
generation of post-9/11 responses to al Qaeda-related terrorism.

